Security/privacy analysis of biometric hashing and template protection for fingerprint minutiae by Topçu, Berkay & Topcu, Berkay
SECURITY/PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF
BIOMETRIC HASHING
AND
TEMPLATE PROTECTION FOR
FINGERPRINT MINUTIAE
by
Berkay Topc¸u
Submitted to
the Graduate School of Engineering and Natural Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
SABANCI UNIVERSITY
June 2016
SECURITY/PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF BIOMETRIC HASHING AND TEMPLATE
PROTECTION FOR FINGERPRINT MINUTIAE
APPROVED BY
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hakan ERDOG˘AN ..............................................
(Thesis Supervisor)
Prof. Dr. Berrin YANIKOG˘LU ..............................................
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mu¨jdat C¸ETI˙N ..............................................
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat SARAC¸LAR ..............................................
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Olcay KURS¸UN ..............................................
DATE OF APPROVAL: ..............................................
c©Berkay Topc¸u 2016
All Rights Reserved
To my family.. . .
iii
Acknowledgements
This Ph.D. experience is not only an immense source of pride for me but also a milestone
in my life; one that will always recall some great moments and incredible people who I
am honored to meet. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all those people
who accompanied me during all these years and make it so unforgettable.
First of all, I would like to sincerely acknowledge and express my gratitude to my ad-
visor Dr. Hakan Erdog˘an for his endless guidance in my professional growth and en-
couragement throughout my graduate studies. I enormously benefited from his wisdom,
profound experience, far-sighted ideas, enthusiasm, and patience over these years. From
the very first day of our collaboration, he always gave me the freedom to explore on my
own and provided continuous support when I struggled. My knowledge in the field is
deeply indebted to what he taught me, and it is my hope that this work offers something
worthwhile in return. I am also thankful to him for setting high standards while teaching
me how to do research, and for editing and commenting on revisions of my paper drafts.
I would like to extend my thanks to the remaining members of my committee, Dr.
Mu¨jdat C¸etin, Dr. Berrin Yanıkog˘lu, Dr. Murat Sarac¸lar and Dr. Olcay Kurs¸un, for
giving generously of their time to read and comment on this manuscript. Dr. Yanıkog˘lu
also played a major role in this research with her unique blend of energy, professional-
ism, and knowledge. I am thankful for her great influence and support in the course of
my studies. I am also grateful to my committee for their contributions and suggestions
to the successful completion of this work. It has never been easy to answer their chal-
lenging questions, but they definitely helped me better understand the weaknesses and
strengths of my research. I also would like to thank my professors from the Faculty of
Engineering and Natural Sciences at Sabancı University for their great contributions to
my undergraduate and graduate studies.
I am forever grateful to my dearest friends, Sezgin Akpınar, Emre Aks¸it, Kerem Bas¸ol,
Mustafa Baytar, and Gu¨venir Kaan Esen for always being on my side and there for me
when I need it. They have been a vital part of my life for such a long time; thus a life
without their friendship is not a full and good one.
My special thanks go to one of the most valuable people in my life, S¸eniz Demir, for her
enormous support and guidance throughout the completion of this thesis. It has been
great to feel her belief in me and my work, and to be able to reach her regardless of time
and place.
iv
I also would like to acknowledge the Scientific and Technological Research Council of
Turkey (TUBI˙TAK) BI˙DEB for National Scholarship Programme (2211) for PhD stu-
dents. Additionally, I would like to thank to my unit head Dr. Oktay Adalıer, and
project manager and colleague Dr. C¸ag˘atay Karabat from TUBI˙TAK BI˙LGEM for
their understanding during heavy periods. In addition, I would like to thank Melis
O¨zgu¨r C¸etinkaya Demir, Edona Fasllija, Elif U¨stu¨ndag˘ Soykan, and Muhammet Yıldız
for creating a friendly working environment in the office.
Last and foremost, I would like to thank my family, Yılmaz, Reyhan, and Esra Topc¸u,
for their unconditional love and continuous support throughout my entire life. I owe a
great debt to them for trusting in me every time I have a dream and a goal to pursue.
SECURITY/PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF BIOMETRIC HASHING AND TEMPLATE
PROTECTION FOR FINGERPRINT MINUTIAE
BERKAY TOPC¸U
EE, Ph.D. Thesis, 2016
Thesis Supervisor: Hakan Erdog˘an
Keywords: Biometrics, biometric template protection, face verification, fingerprint
verification, biohashing.
Abstract
This thesis has two main parts. The first part deals with security and privacy analysis of
biometric hashing. The second part introduces a method for fixed-length feature vector
extraction and hash generation from fingerprint minutiae.
The upsurge of interest in biometric systems has led to development of biometric tem-
plate protection methods in order to overcome security and privacy problems. Biometric
hashing produces a secure binary template by combining a personal secret key and the
biometric of a person, which leads to a two factor authentication method. This disserta-
tion analyzes biometric hashing both from a theoretical point of view and in regards to
its practical application. For theoretical evaluation of biohashes, a systematic approach
which uses estimated entropy based on degree of freedom of a binomial distribution is
outlined. In addition, novel practical security and privacy attacks against face image
hashing are presented to quantify additional protection provided by biometrics in cases
where the secret key is compromised (i.e., the attacker is assumed to know the user’s
secret key). Two of these attacks are based on sparse signal recovery techniques us-
ing one-bit compressed sensing in addition to two other minimum-norm solution based
attacks. A rainbow attack based on a large database of faces is also introduced. The
results show that biometric templates would be in serious danger of being exposed when
the secret key is known by an attacker, and the system would be under a serious threat
as well.
Due to its distinctiveness and performance, fingerprint is preferred among various bio-
metric modalities in many settings. Most fingerprint recognition systems use minutiae
information, which is an unordered collection of minutiae locations and orientations.
Some advanced template protection algorithms (such as fuzzy commitment and other
modern cryptographic alternatives) require a fixed-length binary template. However,
such a template protection method is not directly applicable to fingerprint minutiae
representation which by its nature is of variable size. This dissertation introduces a
novel and empirically validated framework that represents a minutiae set with a rota-
tion invariant fixed-length vector and hence enables using biometric template protection
methods for fingerprint recognition without significant loss in verification performance.
The introduced framework is based on using local representations around each minutia
as observations modeled by a Gaussian mixture model called a universal background
model (UBM). For each fingerprint, we extract a fixed length super-vector of first or-
der statistics through alignment with the UBM. These super-vectors are then used for
learning linear support vector machine (SVM) models per person for verification. In
addition, the fixed-length vector and the linear SVM model are both converted into
binary hashes and the matching process is reduced to calculating the Hamming dis-
tance between them so that modern cryptographic alternatives based on homomorphic
encryption can be applied for minutiae template protection.
BI˙YOMETRI˙K KIYIM I˙C¸I˙N GU¨VENLI˙K/MAHREMI˙YET ANALI˙ZI˙ VE PARMAK
I˙ZI˙ OLAY NOKTALARI I˙C¸I˙N S¸ABLON KORUMA
BERKAY TOPC¸U
EE, Doktora Tezi, 2016
Tez Danıs¸manı: Hakan Erdog˘an
Anahtar Kelimeler: Biyometrik, biyometrik s¸ablon koruma, yu¨z tanıma, parmak izi
dog˘rulama, biyometrik kıyım.
O¨zet
Bu tez c¸alıs¸ması iki ana parc¸adan olus¸maktadır. I˙lk kısım biyometrik kıyım (hash)
yo¨nteminin gu¨venlig˘ini ve mahremiyetini ele almaktadır. I˙kinci kısım ise parmak izi
olay noktaları ic¸in sabit uzunlukta bir vekto¨r ve kıyım olus¸turma yo¨ntemi sunmaktadır.
Biyometrik sistemlere hızla artan ilgi, gu¨venlik ve mahremiyet problemlerini arttrm ve
dolayısıyla biyometrik s¸ablon koruma yo¨ntemlerinin gelis¸tirilmesini de beraberinde ge-
tirmis¸tir. Biyometrik kıyım, kis¸inin biyometrisi ile kis¸isel bir gizli anahtarı birles¸tirerek
gu¨venli bir ikili (binary) s¸ablon olus¸turur ve iki unsurlu bir biyometrik dog˘rulama
yo¨ntemi sunar. Bu tez c¸alıs¸ması, biyometrik kıyım yo¨ntemini hem teorik ac¸ıdan hem de
pratik uygulama yo¨nu¨nden analiz etmektedir. Biyometrik kıyımın teorik deg˘erlendirmesi
kapsamında binomial dag˘ılımın serbestlik derecesine dayalı entropi kestirimini kullanan
sistematik bir yo¨ntem anlatılmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, yu¨z imgesi kıyımına yo¨nelik
o¨zgu¨n gu¨venlik ve mahremiyet atakları sunulmaktadır. Bu ataklar ile kis¸inin gizli
anahtarının art niyetli bir saldırganca bilindig˘i durumlarda biyometrik tarafından sag˘lanan
ilave koruma miktarı o¨lc¸u¨lmektedir. Bu ataklardan ikisi bir-bit sıkıs¸tırmalı algılama
kullanan seyrek is¸aret geri kazanımına dayanmaktadır. Dig˘er iki atak ise en ku¨c¸u¨k
is¸aret boyu c¸o¨zu¨mlerine dayanmaktadır. Bunlara ek olarak bu¨yu¨k bir yu¨z veritabanına
dayalı go¨kkus¸ag˘ı atag˘ı da sunulmaktadır. Sonuc¸lar go¨stermektedir ki, kis¸isel anahtarın
saldırgan tarafından bilindig˘i durumda biyometrik s¸ablon ac¸ıg˘a c¸ıkma tehlikesi ile kars¸ıya
kars¸ıya kalmakta ve aynı zamanda sistem de ciddi tehdit altında bulunmaktadır.
Parmak izi, yu¨ksek ayırdedicilig˘i ve bas¸arımı dolayısıyla pek c¸ok farklı biyometrik o¨zellik
arasından tercih edilmektedir. Parmak izi tanıma sistemlerinin tamamına yakını sıralı
olmayan olay noktalarının konum ve yo¨n bilgilerini kullanmaktadır. Fuzzy commit-
ment ve dig˘er modern kriptografik alternatifler gibi ileri biyometrik s¸ablon koruma
yo¨ntemleri sabit uzunlukta bir o¨znitelik vekto¨ru¨ne ihtiyac¸ duymaktadır. Dolayısıyla,
bu yo¨ntemler dog˘ası gereg˘i farklı sayıda olan parmak izi olay noktalarını korumak ic¸in
kullanılamamaktadır. Bu tez c¸alıs¸ması, parmak izi olay noktaları ku¨mesini do¨nmelere
deg˘is¸imsiz ve sabit uzunlukta bir vekto¨r olarak ifade eden, o¨zgu¨n ve gec¸erlilig˘i deney-
sel olarak go¨sterilmis¸ bir yo¨ntem sunmaktadır. Bu sayede biyometrik s¸ablon koruma
yo¨ntemlerinin ciddi bir performans kaybı olmadan parmak izi tanıma ic¸in kullanılabilmesi
sag˘lanmıs¸tır. Sunulan yo¨ntem, her bir olay noktası etrafındaki yerel go¨sterimleri evrensel
arka plan modeli (UBM) olarak adlandırılan bir Gaussian karıs¸ım modeli ile modellenen
go¨zlemler olarak kullanmaktadır. Her bir parmak izi ic¸in, UBM ile olan dog˘rultusuna
go¨re birinci dereceden istatistiklerin bir su¨per-vekto¨ru¨nu¨ olus¸turulmakta ve bu su¨per-
vekto¨rler, dog˘rulama is¸leminde kullanılmak u¨zere her bir kis¸inin dog˘rusal karar destek
makinesi (SVM) modelini o¨g˘renmek ic¸in kullanılmaktadır. Ayrıca, hem sabit uzun-
luktaki su¨per-vekto¨r hem de dog˘rusal SVM modeli ikili bir kıyıma do¨nu¨s¸tu¨ru¨lmu¨s¸ ve
kars¸ılas¸tırma is¸lemi bu ikisi arasındaki Hamming uzaklıg˘ının hesaplanmasına indirgenmis¸tir.
Bo¨ylelikle, parmak izi olay noktaları homomorfik (benzer yapılı) s¸ifreleme temelli krip-
tografik alternatifler ile korunabilir hale gelmis¸tir.
Contents
Acknowledgements iv
Abstract vi
O¨zet viii
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xv
Abbreviations xvi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Biometric Template Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Template Protection for Fingerprint Minutiae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Related Work 8
2.1 Biometric Recognition Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Biometric Template Protection Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Security and Privacy Evaluation of Biometric Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Unpredictability of Biohashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2 Irreversibility of Biohashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Template Protection for Fingerprint Minutiae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Fixed-length Feature Representation for Minutiae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3 Biometric Hashing and Its Entropy 20
3.1 Enrollment Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.1 Feature Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.2 Random Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1.3 Quantization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 Authentication Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3 Entropy Prediction for Biohashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3.1 Daugman’s Entropy Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
x
Contents xi
3.3.2 Entropy of Biometric Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4 Experiments and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.1 Experimental Setup and Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.2 Entropy Prediction Under Naive Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4.3 Entropy Prediction Under Advanced Threat Model . . . . . . . . . 28
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4 Practical Security and Privacy Attacks Against Biometric Hashing Us-
ing Sparse Recovery 31
4.1 Proposed Feature Approximation Methods from Biohash . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1.1 One-bit Compressive Sensing Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1.1.1 One-bit Compressive Sensing by Linear Programming . . 36
4.1.1.2 Binary Iterative Hard Thresholding . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1.2 Minimum L1 and L2 Norm Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1.2.1 Inversion of the Quantization Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1.2.2 Minimum L2 Norm Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1.2.3 Minimum L1 Norm Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1.3 Reconstructing the Face Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1.4 Other Thresholding Methods - Apart from the “sign” Operator . . 41
4.1.4.1 Fixed or User Specific Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1.4.2 Mean Value is the Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Rainbow Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3 Experiments and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.1 The Database and Experimental Set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.2 The Performance of the Biometric Hashing Scheme . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3.3 The Performance of the Feature Approximation from Biohash
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Advanced Attack Model (AAM): . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Security After Key Change (SAKC): . . . . . . . . . . 45
Attack in the Long-term (ALT): . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3.3.1 Results for One-bit Compressive Sensing Approaches . . 46
4.3.3.2 Results for Minimum Norm Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.3.3 Computation Times for the Proposed Feature Approxi-
mation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3.4 Results for the Rainbow Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Collusion Model (CM): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Security After Key Change (SAKC): . . . . . . . . . . 51
Attack in the Long-term (ALT): . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.5 Privacy Assessment of the Proposed Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5 Template Protection for Fingerprint Spectral Minutiae 59
5.1 Biometric Hashing with Fingerprint Spectral Minutiae . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.1.1 Spectral Minutiae Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.1.2 Protecting SMC Template with Biometric Hashing . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1.3 Experiments and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1.3.1 Experimental Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Contents xii
5.1.3.2 Results for the Naive Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1.3.3 Results for Stolen Key Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.1.3.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6 GMM-SVM Fingerprint Verification 69
6.1 DCT-based Minutiae Patch Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.1.1 Minutia Patch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.1.2 Gaussian minutia patch image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.1.3 DCT representation for minutia patches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Minutiae Pair Matching via DCT Patches . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.2 GMM Supervector Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.3 Linear SVM Training for Template Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.3.1 Initial Experiments and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.3.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.4 Asymmetric Locality Sensitive Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.4.1 Locality Sensitive Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.4.1.1 LSH for correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.4.2 Asymmetric Feature Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.4.3 Experiments and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.5 Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.5.1 Dimension Reduction with PCA before SVM Training . . . . . . . 86
6.5.2 Random Minutiae Sampling for SVM Training . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.6 Flexibility of the Framework - Enabling Other Possibilities . . . . . . . . . 93
6.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7 Conclusion and Future Work 96
7.1 Evaluation of Biometric Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.2 Template Protection for Fingerprint Minutiae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Bibliography 99
List of Figures
2.1 A sample ROC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Biometric hashing verification setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Distribution of Hamming distances of interclass comparisons for iris phase
codes [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Distribution of normalized Hamming distances of interclass comparisons
of biohashes with various lengths and different threat models - first col-
umn: naive threat model and second column: advanced threat model . . . 29
4.1 Overview of a biometric hashing system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2 Illustration of the proposed attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3 (a) Cumulative energy contained in PCA coefficients. (b) Distribution of
1024 dimensional PCA coefficients of a sample from the database. . . . . 35
4.4 DET curves for the proposed methods under the scenario Attack in the
Long-Term. (a) Reconstruction of 200 dimensional PCA feature vectors
from biohash of length 1024-bits. (b) Reconstruction of 1024 dimensional
PCA feature vectors from biohash of length 1024-bits. . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.5 Rainbow attack - faces that provide close biohashes. . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.6 Reconstructed face images from biohashes of length 1024-bits - PCA di-
mension 200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.7 Reconstructed face images from biohashes of length 1024-bits - PCA di-
mension 1024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.8 Reconstructed face images using the LP method for different biohash bit
lengths (128, 256, 512 and 1024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.9 DET curves for direct feature level comparisons - 200-dimensional PCA
feature vectors & biohash length = 1024-bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.1 Minutiae locations and set of minutiae represented by Gaussian functions 61
5.2 Complex spectral minutiae representation of a fingerprint . . . . . . . . . 62
5.3 Two factor authentication - secret key and fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.4 BioHashing procedure - from spectral representation to bit string . . . . . 63
5.5 Genuine and imposter distance distribution for the FVC2002DB1A database 65
5.6 Genuine and imposter distance distribution for the FVC2002DB1A database
for the stolen key scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.1 Overall framework of the GMM-SVM fingerprint verification system . . . 70
6.2 DCT representation of a minutia patch image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.3 Selected minutiae patches of two neighbor minutia from the same finger-
print image (before rotation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.4 Minutiae pairing matrix and selection of highest score at each turn . . . . 73
xiii
List of Figures xiv
6.5 GMM supervector generation from a single fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.6 Illustration of the LSH scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.7 Relation between the correlation and the expected normalized Hamming
distance together with 95% confidence intervals for different hash lengths 83
6.8 EERs for different hash dimensions - FVC2002DB1A . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.9 Error rates for FVC2002DB1A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.10 ALSH hash generation time from GMM-SVM feature . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.11 ALSH hash matching time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.12 EERs for different hash dimensions - FVC2002DB2A . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.13 Error rates for FVC2002DB2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.14 Overall framework and other possibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
List of Tables
2.1 Existing biohash inversion attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 Mean value, standard deviations, and degrees of freedom for different bit
lengths under both scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1 Equal Error Rates (%) for biohash vectors of different lengths . . . . . . . 44
4.2 Equal Error Rates (%) when the adversary has the true biometric features
but does not possess the associated secret key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3 Equal Error Rates (%) for one-bit compressive sensing approaches - linear
programming (LP) method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.4 Equal Error Rates (%) for one-bit compressive sensing approaches - BIHT
method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.5 Equal Error Rates (%) for minimum norm solutions - L2 norm . . . . . . 48
4.6 Equal Error Rates (%) for minimum norm solutions - L1 norm . . . . . . 48
4.7 FAR1000 values for the proposed methods under the scenario Attack in
the Long-Term. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.8 Computation time required to estimate a feature vector from a given
biohash (in seconds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.9 Equal Error Rates (%) for the rainbow attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.10 Equal Error Rates (%) for direct feature level comparisons - 200-dimensional
PCA feature vectors & biohash length = 1024-bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1 EER on FVC2002 databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2 EER on FVC2002 databases - stolen key scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.1 Number of fingerprints used in GMM training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.2 Equal error rates for GMMs with different number of Gaussians . . . . . . 79
6.3 Equal error rates for Asymmetric Locality Sensitive Hashing for correlation 86
6.4 Number of subsets selected for different percentages of minutiae . . . . . . 87
6.5 Equal error rates of the improved system for FVC2002DB1A . . . . . . . 88
6.6 FAR1000 values of the improved ALSH scheme for FVC2002DB1A . . . . 88
6.7 Equal error rates of the improved system for FVC2002DB2A . . . . . . . 91
6.8 FAR1000 values of the improved ALSH scheme for FVC2002DB2A . . . . 91
xv
Abbreviations
AAM Advanced Attack Model
ALT Attack in the Long Term
AFIS Automated Fingerprint Identification System
ALSH Asymmetric Locality Sensitive Hashing
BIHT Binary Iterative Hard Thresholding
CM Collusion Model
DCT Discrete Cosine Transform
DET Decision Error Tradeoff
EER Equal Error Rate
EM Expectation Maximization
FAR False Acceptance Rate
FMT Fourier Mellin Transform
FRR False Rejection Rate
FTA Failure To Acquire
FTC Failure To Capture
FTD Failure To Detect
FTE Failure To Enroll
FTP Failure To Process
FVC Fingerprint Verification Competition
FpVTE Fingerprint Vendor Technology Competition
GMM Gaussian Mixture Model
IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
ID Identity Document
IHT Iterative Hard Thresholding
IRIS Inversion for the Same Biometric System
xvi
Abbreviations xvii
ISO International Organization for Standardization
JPEG Joint Photographic Experts Group
LBP Local Binary Patterns
LDA Linear Discriminant Analysis
LP Linear Programming
LSH Locality Sensitive Hashing
MAP Maximum A Posteriori
MCC Minutiae Cylinder Code
MLP Multi Layer Perceptron
PCA Principal Ccomponent Analysis
PDF Probability Distribution Function
PIN Personal Identification Number
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RP Random Projection
SAKC Security After Key Change
SDK Software Development Kit
SMC Complex Spectral Minutiae
SML Location based Spectral Minutiae
SMO Orientation based Spectral Minutiae
SRP Signed Random Projection
SVM Support Vector Machine
UBM Universal Background Model
USB Universal Serial Bus
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Biometric Template Protection
Biometric traits (such as fingerprint, face, and iris) are inalienable and distinctive at-
tributes that can be used in establishing personal identities. For instance, fingerprints
are ubiquitous in that each and every person but those with some kinds of physical
disabilities has fingerprints. Additionally, fingerprints are unique to each person and
no more than one person has the same fingerprint. Distinguishing and to some extent
permanent characteristics of biometric traits offer greater security and convenience than
traditional forms of verification that are based on passwords or tokens (such as PIN num-
bers and ID cards). Biometric authentication systems have been used to authenticate
personal identities in many real world applications such as electronic identity cards, bor-
der control systems with electronic travel documents, electronic payment systems, and
forensics applications since they provide a fast, reliable, and secure electronic authenti-
cation mechanism. The societal importance of biometrics and its main contributions to
our daily lives are enormous as succinctly stated in [2]:
Biometrics is not only a fascinating pattern recognition research problem
but, if carefully used, is an enabling technology with the potential to make
our society safer, reduce fraud and provide user convenience.
Automatically determining the validity of an identity claim by a person is a critical
task, but unfortunately, the knowledge-based mechanisms and similarly token-based
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authentication systems are not able to meet this challenge. Neither a token nor a
password, which can be stolen or handed over easily, provides a unique link between a
person and his identity. At the governmental level, e-Passports store fingerprints and face
photos in Europe. For visa application and border control, the US visit program keeps
records of 10 fingers and face images of each person. In addition, automated fingerprint
identification systems (AFIS), which are fingerprint and criminal history systems, help
local, state, and federal partners solve and prevent crime by catching criminals and
terrorists with the use of automated fingerprint and latent search capabilities. FBI IAFIS
includes not only fingerprints but also additional biometrics such as corresponding mug
shots and photos of scars and tattoos.
However, widespread deployment of biometric authentication systems in real world ap-
plications brings about severe security and privacy concerns [3–5]. This is the main
driving force behind significant research efforts put forward to protect biometric tem-
plates of users. In the literature, several biometric template protection methods have
been proposed (e.g., fuzzy commitment scheme [6] and biohashing [7]) in order to over-
come these concerns by securing biometric templates. As another advantage, protected
templates ideally enable multiple secure references to be created from the same biomet-
ric data. These secure references are supposed to be unlinkable and non-invertible in
order to achieve the desired level of security and to fulfill privacy requirements.
The main goals of template protection are i) security, ii) privacy protection ability, iii)
and unlinkability [8]. Security of a protected template corresponds to the difficulty
of creating a “pre-image” of the template that gives a positive authentication result.
Privacy protection ability of a protected template involves irreversibility and privacy
leakage. Irreversibility indicates the hardness in retrieving original biometric data and
privacy leakage shows the amount of information exposed in protected templates about
the biometric data [3]. Another motivation for template protection is to prevent linking
protected templates. It should not be easy for an adversary to decide whether two
protected templates belong to same subject or not (cross matching). Moreover, the
combination of two or more protected templates should not reveal secrets or biometric
features (leakage amplification).
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Biometric hashing (biohashing) scheme is a transformation-based template protection
method that projects an input biometric trait to a pseudo-random space. After a thresh-
olding step, the biometric sample of a user is converted into a binary vector. Biohashing
is used to secure different biometric modalities such as fingerprints [7], faces [9], and
palms [10]. It uses a user specific secret key for creating a random projection specific
to each user. The ability to revoke the biohash of a user by simply assigning a new
secret key in cases where the secret key of a user is compromised is a major advantage of
biohashing. It is also possible to generate different biohashes with different secret keys.
This allows a person to enroll to different services using his unique biometric data and
prevents linkability.
Due to increased inter-class variation and preserved intra-class variation, biohashing
significantly improves the matching performance. On the other hand, this performance
degrades if the secret key of the user is known to the adversary. However, empirical
studies showed that even in such cases, the matching accuracy is still comparable to
that of unprotected biometric templates.
Although biohashing methods have become very popular due to their high authentication
performance and easy deployment into match-on-card applications, research recently
showed that they may suffer from serious security and privacy problems [8, 11–13]. A
comprehensive security and privacy evaluation of biometric template protection methods
can be carried out by theoretically analyzing the underlying methodology and assessing
its vulnerabilities under practical attacks. In this dissertation, we present the first
successful theoretical evaluation of biometric hashing as required for thorough analysis,
where the unpredictability of biohashes generated by random projection (RP) based
biohashing scheme is quantified via estimated entropy. The amount of information a
biohash carries is quantitatively analyzed by measuring the entropy of a biohash obtained
from a face image. Furthermore, to assess to what extent a biohash is unpredictable
once the secret key of a user is stolen, we calculate the entropy of biohashes obtained
using the same key but using biometric data from arbitrary people.
From a practical point of view, the strength of transformation-based methods is based
on the hardness of invertibility of the underlying transformation. Introduction of prac-
tical attacks against biometric template protection methods are interesting since they
reveal vulnerabilities in these methods. If a practical attack can be found, then this
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simply shows that the method cannot be reliably used for template protection. In some
studies [11, 14], computational inversion techniques for biohashing and practical secu-
rity analysis of biohashes have been explored. In this work, we have also addressed the
reconstruction of face recognition features from face biohashes with a novel use of two
different sparse recovery techniques from one-bit compressed sensing measurements. In
addition, we introduce two minimum-norm solution attacks and a rainbow attack which
makes use of a large database of faces..
1.2 Template Protection for Fingerprint Minutiae
Among various biometric modalities, fingerprint is preferred in many settings, due to its
distinctiveness and performance, as well as the practicality and low cost of fingerprint
readers. Most fingerprint recognition systems depend on the comparison of minutiae
which are the endpoints and bifurcations of fingerprint ridges. They are known to
remain unchanged throughout an individual’s lifetime and enable a very discriminative
classification of fingerprints [2].
Increasing use of fingerprint identification as well as other biometric modalities raise
privacy concerns significantly [15] and hence protecting biometric fingerprint templates
(mostly minutiae templates) becomes a requirement. We need a fixed-length orientation-
invariant fingerprint representation to be able to use advanced template protection al-
gorithms such as fuzzy commitment and modern cryptographic alternatives based on
homomorphic encryption. However, the number of minutiae in a fingerprint depends
on various conditions. For instance, two impressions of the same finger might not have
an equal number of minutiae due to difficulties in fingerprint imaging and automatic
minutiae extraction. This difference may result from the placement of a finger on the
fingerprint reader (rotation or translation), elasticity of the skin (non-linear distortion),
dryness or wetness of the finger, or the current amount of pressure applied. In addition,
in cases where two impressions of the same finger are captured by two different read-
ers, differences in the sensing area and sensor intrinsic properties may lead to a varying
number of minutiae.
Spectral minutiae representation [16] proposes a method for combining fingerprint recog-
nition with template protection. It transforms a minutiae set into a fixed-length feature
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vector by representing minutiae as a magnitude spectrum. This transformation is in-
variant to translation. Furthermore, rotation and scaling become easily compensated
translations under this transformation. In this work, we present the first successful
implementation of biometric hashing for spectral minutiae.
In practice, an alignment based on singular points (core and delta) is required for spectral
minutiae representation in order to achieve good recognition performances [17] because a
large rotation or a translation might lead to partial overlap between different impressions
of the same finger. Additionally, missing or spurious minutiae lead to lower matching
performances. To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a novel framework that enables
the generation of a fixed-length feature vector representation for fingerprint minutiae
based on local representations unlike spectral minutiae.
In our new representation, each minutia is represented as a minutia patch which en-
codes its geometric relations with other closely located minutiae. A minutia patch is
translated and rotated accordingly to eliminate the registration requirement due to the
relative alignment of fingerprints. Thus, a rotation invariant representation is obtained.
The distribution of minutiae patches is modeled via a single user-independent Gaussian
mixture model (GMM) called universal background model (UBM) and a fingerprint is
represented with its probabilistic alignment to the UBM mixture components. We ob-
tain first-order statistics from the alignment to UBM mixture components and use them
to form a super-vector to represent each fingerprint. We further train a linear SVM in
this large-dimensional vector space to discriminate a person’s fingerprint from other peo-
ple’s fingerprints. This idea is borrowed from speaker verification literature where each
frame of an utterance is assumed as a separate observation and a similar GMM-SVM
approach is used for verification [18]. In this approach each minutia patch is analogous
to a frame of speech and a collection of minutia patches which forms a fingerprint is
analogous to an utterance.
Even though the above approach obtains fixed length vectors for representing fingerprints
and their linear SVM models are also vectors of the same size, the representations
are not binary and they may not be directly used with template protection methods
which require binary representations. Hence, we explore the use of asymmetric locality
sensitive hashing (ALSH) to map these vectors into binary strings and the inner products
between vectors are approximated by the Hamming distance between mapped binary
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strings. In this framework, both fingerprints and linear SVM models are represented as
binary strings and the decision is made by thresholding the Hamming distance between
them, but the mapping to binary domain is slightly different for fingerprint vectors and
SVM models, hence the locality sensitive hashing is asymmetric. In this framework, a
fixed-length minutiae vector is also transformed into a binary string using asymmetric
locality sensitive hashing (ALSH) [19]. Our framework is able to create a fixed-length
binary feature vector of fingerprints to represent minutiae information. This enables the
protection of fingerprint minutiae via current template protection methods such as fuzzy
commitment and biometric hashing as well as application of homomorphic encryption
techniques.
1.3 Contributions
In this dissertation, biometric template protection methods are addressed. Biometric
hashing is analyzed from security and privacy aspects. In addition, template protection
for fingerprint minutiae is discussed in detail and novel solutions are proposed.
The contributions of this research are summarized as follows:
• This work presents the first successful theoretical evaluation of biometric hashing
as required for thorough analysis where unpredictability of biohashes is quantified
via estimated entropy.
• This work estimates entropy of biohashes using the degree of freedom of binomial
distribution as described by Daugman [1]. Our work demonstrates that Daugman’s
entropy estimation is not restricted only to iris but can also be applied to other
biometric modalities that can be represented with a fixed-length binary string and
compared via Hamming distance.
• This work proposes four novel optimization-based methods that aim to reconstruct
the feature vector from a biohash. Assuming that an adversary gains access to the
biohash vector of a user and the corresponding secret key, these methods can
be used to estimate a new real-valued feature vector from binary biohash and
authenticate to the system.
Introduction 7
• This work introduces the first practical security and privacy attacks against bio-
hashes using one-bit compressive sensing framework. Apart from that, minimum
norm solutions are discussed in detail and L1 norm minimization is introduced in
addition to the L2 norm minimization which previously appeared in the literature.
Finally, this work introduces a type of “rainbow attack” against biometric hashing
systems.
• This work evaluates spectral minutiae representation in depth and proposes the
first implementation of biometric hashing for spectral minutiae.
• This work describes an underlying framework that enables the generation of a novel
fixed-length feature vector representation for fingerprint minutiae based on GMM-
SVM approach. The framework allows biometric template protection methods to
be applied to fingerprint minutiae.
• This work presents the use of asymmetric locality sensitive hashing for binary
strings generation from GMM-SVM fingerprint features. This allows fast and
efficient matching via Hamming distance.
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 discusses related work in various research areas that is relevant to our work.
Chapter 3 describes biometric hashing in detail and presents entropy analysis of bio-
hashes.
Chapter 4 presents novel methods for reconstructing biometric features from biohashes
via sparse recovery.
Chapter 5 presents spectral minutiae representation in detail and provides the first
implementation of biometric hashing for spectral minutiae.
Chapter 6 describes an underlying framework that enables the generation of a novel
fixed-length feature vector representation for fingerprint minutiae and presents a
binary hash generation method.
Chapter 7 presents our conclusions and future plans on extending this research.
Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter presents related work in several disparate fields that is relevant to our work
and describes how our work both builds on and differs from this existing research. Sec-
tion 2.1 presents the fundamentals of biometric recognition systems. Section 2.2 looks
at research efforts aimed at enhancing security and privacy aspects of biometric recogni-
tion systems by protecting biometric templates of users. Section 2.3 discusses potential
vulnerabilities of biometric template protection methods and possible attacks against
biometric hashing. Section 2.4 discusses research efforts specific to protecting finger-
print minutiae templates. Section 2.5 discusses fixed-length minutiae representations
that is required for template protection.
2.1 Biometric Recognition Systems
Biometric recognition (simply biometrics) refers to the use of distinctive physical/phys-
iological (e.g., fingerprints, face, and iris) or behavioral (e.g., speech) characteristics for
automatically recognizing the identity of an individual or verifying/authenticating his
claimed identity. These characteristics are called as biometric identifiers or traits.
Recognizing a person by his body and linking it to an identity is a very powerful tool
for identity management. Biometrics is becoming an essential component of effective
person identification solutions since biometric identifiers cannot be shared or misplaced,
and they intrinsically represent individuals’ bodily identities.
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Three main management tools for the identification of a person are: i) what you have
(i.e., ID cards), ii) what you know (i.e., password or PIN), and iii) who you are (i.e.,
biometrics). Biometrics are accepted as more reliable in recognizing a person than
traditional token or knowledge-based methods due to their inalienable nature (e.g., they
cannot be easily misplaced, forged, or shared). Some biometric characteristics that
have been used for automated recognition include fingerprints, iris, face, hand or finger
geometry, retina, voice, signature, and keystroke dynamics.
Automated biometric recognition systems consists of the following steps. A biometric
sample is taken from an individual, for instance, a fingerprint or an iris scan, which
might be represented by an image. Representative data (a biometric template) are often
extracted from that sample. This biometric data, either the image or the template or
both, is then stored on a storage medium which could be a database or a distributed
environment (e.g., smart cards). All these phases constitute the enrolment process.
At a later stage, if a person presents himself to the system, the system will ask the person
to submit his biometric characteristic(s). The system will then compare the image of the
submitted sample (or the template extracted from it) with the biometric data/template
taken during enrolment. The person is then recognized and accepted by the system if a
match is obtained. If there is no match, the person is not recognized and “rejected” by
the system.
Depending on the application context, a biometric system may either perform the veri-
fication or identification task:
• A verification system authenticates a person’s identity by comparing the captured
biometric characteristics with his previously captured biometric reference template
that is pre-stored in the system. It conducts a one-to-one matching to confirm
whether the claimed identity of the individual is true.
• An identification system recognizes an individual by searching the entire enrolment
template database for a match by conducting one-to-many comparisons.
Although biometrics promise to correctly identify or validate the identity of a subject,
in practice, a biometric system is a pattern recognition system that inevitably makes
some incorrect decisions. Some of the main source of errors are capture systems (i.e.,
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Failure to Detect (FTD) and Failure to Capture (FTC)) and feature extraction (i.e.,
Failure to Process (FTP)). These kinds of errors can be combined into a single measure
which is called as the “Failure to Acquire (FTA)”. Another source of errors, named
as the “Failure to Enroll (FTE)”, is observed when there is not enough discriminatory
information present in the feature sets.
Throughout this work, we focus on the verification task where a one-to-one matching be-
tween a reference biometric template and a query biometric template is performed. Two
types of errors that can be committed by a verification system are the “false match” and
“false non-match”. False match corresponds to mistaking templates from two different
subjects as belonging to the same subject. False non-match corresponds to mistaking
two templates of the same subject to be from two different subjects. Although they do
not exactly stand for each other, false acceptance and false rejection are commonly used
in the same context.
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Figure 2.1: A sample ROC
In this work, we use the “False Acceptance Rare (FAR)” and “False Rejection Rate
(FRR)” for evaluating the verification performance of biometric systems. There is a
trade-off between these two types of errors since we can decrease one by increasing the
other one. This is achieved by changing a decision threshold. We can plot FAR versus
FRR in a detection error trade-off (DET) curve. An example DET curve is shown in
Figure 2.1. Each point on the curve corresponds to using a different decision threshold.
Same information can also be conveyed using a receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve which plots true accept rates versus false reject rates. We also employ the “Equal
Related Work 11
Error Rate (EER)” of a verification system, which is the error rate at a point where
FAR and FRR are identical.
2.2 Biometric Template Protection Methods
Biometric recognition systems enable fast, reliable, and secure electronic authentication,
however, their large scale deployment in real world applications causes privacy and secu-
rity concerns [3–5]. Biometric systems are not foolproof and a critical vulnerability that
is unique to biometrics systems is the possession of stored templates by adversaries [11].
Biometric data might reveal sensitive information such as race, gender, and certain med-
ical conditions. Since biometric traits are supposed to be permanent and unique to an
individual, stolen templates can be used as unique identifiers to link information across
different applications. Moreover, biometric modalities are limited in number and they
cannot be easily revoked to obtain another template as seen in the use of passwords.
Therefore, it is essential to ensure the security of biometric templates and to protect
biometric data. In the literature, several biometric template protection methods have
been proposed [15] (e.g., fuzzy commitment scheme [6] and biohashing [7]) to overcome
these concerns by securing biometric templates (e.g., face and fingerprint). Biometric
template protection methods store a modified version of the biometric template and
reveal as little information about the original biometric trait as possible without losing
the capability to identify a person.
Template protection methods can be categorized into two groups: i) biometric cryp-
tosystems [15] (e.g., fuzzy commitment [6], fuzzy vault [20]) and ii) transformation-
based methods/salting [2] (e.g., biohashing [7]). Biometric cryptosystems either bind
secrets into biometric data to form a secure biometric template or generate secrets
from biometric data with the help of some auxiliary data. The secrets can be success-
fully retrieved during a genuine verification attempt. The helper or auxiliary data does
not reveal significant information about the biometric or the key. On the other hand,
transformation-based approaches distort or randomize biometric data with the use of
non-invertible functions so that the original data cannot be reconstructed from trans-
formed templates. Biometric templates are transformed using parameters derived from
external information such as user keys or passwords.
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Biohashing or biometric hashing [7, 9] is one of the transformation-based methods, in
which the biometric template of the user is transformed into a protected binary string
through multiplication with a pseudo-random projection matrix and quantization. Due
to increased inter-class variation and preservation of intra-class variation, biohashing
significantly improves verification accuracy when the secret key is kept secure and un-
known to adversaries. In this thesis, we use the terms biohashing and biometric hashing
synonymously, even though we think biometric hashing is a more descriptive name.
In addition to the increased performance of the protected templates when the secret key
of a user is kept safe, another advantage of biometric hashing lies in the ease of revoking
a transformed template by changing the associated secret key. Furthermore, using the
same biometric data, a user can be authenticated to different services through different
biohashes generated from distinct secret keys. This way, two records that are presented
to two different systems cannot be linked and activities of the user is kept private.
2.3 Security and Privacy Evaluation of Biometric Hashing
Biometric hashing uses a unique secret key in order to randomize biometric template of
each user. It is a two factor authentication system in which both the biometric modal-
ity and the secret key of a user have to be presented during authentication. Although
biohashing methods have become very popular due to their high authentication perfor-
mance and easy deployment into match-on-card applications, research recently showed
that they might suffer from serious security and privacy problems [8, 11, 13, 21].
We believe that it is necessary to study the security and privacy preservation capabilities
of biometric hashing especially when the secret key is compromised. If the key is always
assumed to be kept secure, an authentication system which checks the accuracy of the
entered key will achieve a zero verification error even without any need for biometric
data.
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2.3.1 Unpredictability of Biohashes
A comprehensive evaluation of biometric template protection methods can be carried
out by theoretically analyzing the underlying methodology and assessing its vulnerabil-
ities under practical attacks. For biometric cryptosystems, there exist some theoretical
analyses utilizing information theoretical metrics (e.g., entropy, conditional entropy, and
mutual information) or metrics used in cryptanalysis (e.g., min-entropy, average min-
entropy, guessing entropy, and conditional guessing entropy) [8]. However, the applica-
bility of these metrics to empirical evaluation and their computation in practice are still
unknown and need further investigation. Unfortunately, transformation-based methods
lack any such theoretical analysis.
In this work, we present the first successful theoretical evaluation of biometric hashing
as required for thorough analysis where the unpredictability of biohashes generated by
random projection (RP) based biohashing scheme is quantified via estimated entropy.
2.3.2 Irreversibility of Biohashes
The security performance of a biohashing scheme under the assumption of a known
key is analyzed in [22] and [23], and biohashing is concluded to be a good biometric
randomization algorithm with a high risk of compromising the biometric information.
If the secret key of a user is compromised, the security of the protected template is at
stake and it is only dependent on the non-invertibility of the biohash (i.e., it should be
hard for an adversary to approximate the biometric feature vector from the biohash and
the secret key). The reconstruction of a sufficiently similar feature vector that provides
a close biohash to the original one, called a pre-image attack (masquerade attack), is a
major threat to the template protection capability of a biometric hashing scheme. It is
not sufficient to make a function “lossy” (not one-to-one) in order to have a one-way
function [24]. The biohashing method of Ngo et al. is presented as a one-way function [9],
however, we show that this is not the case (in the cryptographic sense) and biometric
hashing is not pre-image attack resistant if the secret key that is used for generating a
biohash is known to the adversary.
Related Work 14
In the first study that investigates the invertibility of a biometric hashing algorithm [25],
it was assumed that the biohash of a user and the corresponding random projection ma-
trix are available to an adversary. Each dimension of the biohash vector was mapped to
the set {−1, 1} (by mapping [0]→[-1] and [1]→[1]) and the resulting vector was multi-
plied with the pseudo-inverse of the random projection matrix. A new biohash created
from the estimated biometric feature vector was used to perform imposter attacks. A
similar approach that uses the pseudo inverse of a random projection matrix was also
presented in [26]. In [27], a new method was proposed to generate a biometric feature
from biohashes using genetic algorithms. For each biohash in a database, the proposed
genetic algorithm was applied to approximate the value of the biometric feature given
the corresponding secret key.
A detailed analysis of irreversibility of biohashes was performed by Feng et al. [14] where
the details of the random projection is solved using perceptron learning. It was assumed
that the attacker does not have the secret key of the user and the parameters of the
random projection are estimated using stolen biohashes and a local biometric database.
The main difference of this study is that the method requires several stolen biohashes
from several distinct subjects (68 subjects - 105 images/subject for one database and
350 subjects - 40 images/subject for another database) for parameter estimation. It
was assumed that the whole system is available to the adversary as a black box and
the matching scores could be eavesdropped. A local face dataset (3500 different local
faces) was presented to the system along with a common token and every local binary
template was matched against every stolen template. Using the matching scores and the
stolen biohashes, local binary biohashes corresponding to the local face database were
calculated, which were used for iterative perceptron learning to estimate the projection
parameters. Once the parameters of the random projection were estimated, they could
be used to generate synthetic real-valued features from a stolen biohash which is another
perceptron problem.
In another recent study, Nagar et al. [11] presented a method to recover a close approx-
imation to the original biometric features given the binary biohash vector of a subject
and the transformation parameters by formulating the problem as an optimization prob-
lem. A database of unrelated biometric features was used for optimization. For each
unrelated biometric feature vector from the database, a new feature vector was esti-
mated by minimizing the Euclidean distance between the new feature vector and the
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unrelated biometric feature vector subject to the consistency criterion (i.e., the new bio-
hash created from the estimated feature vector exactly matches the original biohash).
The estimated feature vector was computed by taking the weighted average of t number
of trials where the weight was the Hamming distance between the original biohash and
the estimated one. This promising approach attempts to invert biohashes in a similar
set-up with our proposed methods. Therefore, we compare our algorithms in terms of
verification errors and computation times with this attack.
In this thesis, we propose four different novel optimization-based methods that aim to
predict the feature vector and/or the biometric image itself. Here, we assume that an
adversary gains access to the biohash vector of a valid system user and the corresponding
secret key, and estimates a new real-valued feature vector from the binary biohash in
order to authenticate to the system. Novel feature estimation methods are in the focus
of this study.
Our novel contributions regarding the reversibility of biohashes can be stated as follows.
Practical security and privacy attacks against biohashes using one-bit compressive sens-
ing framework are introduced. Apart from that, minimum norm solutions are discussed
in detail and L1 norm minimization is introduced in addition to the L2 norm minimiza-
tion which appeared in the literature before. Finally, this study introduces a type of
“rainbow attack” against biometric hashing systems. The differences between the exist-
ing attacks and our proposed attack are given in Table 2.1 in terms of assumptions and
related security and privacy issues.
2.4 Template Protection for Fingerprint Minutiae
Template protection schemes require either a fixed length feature vector representation
or a binarized string as input. Thus, a variable length minutiae representation of a
fingerprint cannot be directly used in combination with these schemes. In addition,
some template protection schemes designed specifically to work with unordered sets of
varying number of minutiae (e.g., fuzzy vault [28]) experience degradation in matching
accuracy due to alignment issues and nonlinear distortion [29].
Fuzzy vault scheme secures a set of r minutiae points by generating a uniformly random
cryptographic key of L bits and transforming it into a polynomial P of degree k (where
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Table 2.1: Existing biohash inversion attacks
Method Assumptions Security Privacy
Multiply with the - Random projection Attack with biohash
pseudo-inverse of matrix is available from estimated features:
the random projection - Threshold is fixed - existing key
matrix [25, 26] and it is 0 - a new key is assigned
- Wavelet FMT face and stolen again
features
Genetic algorithms - Random projection 1) Attack with biohash
[27] matrix is available from estimated features:
- Threshold is fixed - existing key
and it is 0 - a new key is assigned
- Fingercode features and stolen again
2) Average distance
between real and
approximated features
Solve a constrained - Random projection Attack with biohash Reconstructed
minimization of matrix is available from estimated features: face images
distance between - Threshold is available - existing key from estimated
estimated features - A database of - a new key is assigned vector using
and unrelated unrelated features and stolen again PCA inversion
feature vector [11] - Eigenface features
Perceptron-learning - Several biohashes Identification scenario, Adversary has
with hill climbing & of various different where biohash generated access to output
MLP modeling with subjects are available from each synthetic face of feature extractor
customized hill- (other methods assume is matched against the given a face image
climbing [14] availability of a single stolen templates & applies hill-
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k < r). All the minutiae points in a fingerprint is then evaluated on this polynomial
and the obtained set of points is secured by hiding them among a large set of randomly
generated chaff points that do not lie on the polynomial P . The polynomial evaluation of
the combination of genuine and chaff points constitute the vault. During authentication,
the polynomial P can be successfully reconstructed by identifying the genuine points in
the vault that are associated with the minutiae of the enrolled fingerprint if the query
fingerprint is sufficiently close.
Attacks via record multiplicity, stolen key inversion attack and blended substitution
attack are some specific attacks against a fuzzy vault [30]. If an attacker obtains two
different vaults generated from the same biometric data, he can easily identify the gen-
uine points and decode the vault. In addition, if an adversary learns the key embedded
in the vault, he can decode the vault and obtain the biometric template. Furthermore,
an adversary can substitute a few points in the vault using his fingerprint minutiae with-
out being detected, since the vault contains a large number of chaff points. Thus, both
the genuine user and the attacker can successfully authenticate to the system under the
same identity (i.e., blended substitution [29]).
One of the earliest works on fingerprint template protection has secured minutiae in-
formation x, y, θ separately [31]. In a later study, FingerCode feature (a texture based
fingerprint representation without minutiae information [32]) has been protected via
biohashing [7]. Another branch of research has focused on securing each minutia sepa-
rately. Yang et al. [12, 21] have proposed methods to extract a binary secure hash bit
string from each minutia and its vicinity using minutiae information only. A more recent
study similarly has used neighboring minutiae information along with texture informa-
tion around each minutia and secured each minutia feature vector by biohashing [33].
Protected Minutiae Cylinder-Code (P-MCC) [34], one of the most accurate algorithms
proposed recently, has secured each MCC structure that corresponds to a single minu-
tia. All these studies have represented a single minutia with a fixed length binary string
therefore matching between variable length final templates has been addressed as a
minutiae pairing problem.
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2.5 Fixed-length Feature Representation for Minutiae
Unfortunately, only a limited number of studies has presented methods for converting
a minutiae set into fixed length feature vectors. In the work of Sutcu et al. [35], binary
features were extracted by counting the number of minutiae present in randomly chosen
cuboidal patches in the (x, y, θ) space occupied by the minutia. To chose a cuboid, an
origin was selected uniformly at random in (x, y, θ) space, and the dimensions along the
three axes were also randomly chosen. Next, the threshold was defined as the median of
the number of minutiae points in the chosen cuboid, measured across the whole training
set. The threshold value might differ for each cuboid based on its position and volume.
If the number of minutiae points in a randomly generated cuboid exceeded the threshold,
then a 1-bit was appended to the feature vector, otherwise a 0-bit was appended. N
such random selections of cuboid resulted in an N -bit feature vector.
Nagar et al. [36] improved over [35] in a fundamental way such that each cuboid gen-
erates a richer feature set from which a larger number of bits could be extracted and
those with the highest determinability are used for matching. Corresponding to each
randomly chosen cuboid, they introduced three minutiae-based features: (i) aggregate
wall distance: the summation of the closest distance of each minutia from the cuboid
boundary, (ii) minutiae average: the average coordinate of all minutiae present in each
cuboid in a given fingerprint sample, and (iii) minutiae deviation: the standard devia-
tion of minutiae coordinates present in each cuboid in a given fingerprint sample. The
extracted features were binarized using the median value of a given feature calculated
over all enrolled fingerprints. Using the median value as threshold ensured that each bit
has equal probability of being 1 or 0. The main limitation of this approach is that it
requires the fingerprints to be aligned beforehand [37].
Bringer et al. [38] characterized a fingerprint in terms of its similarity to each represen-
tative local minutiae vicinities in a set of fixed size. This fixed size set was extracted
from a representative database of all existing vicinities in the world of fingerprints. For a
fingerprint, a feature vector that contains the similarities of its vicinities to those of the
representative set was produced. The reported verification performance was far from the
classical minutiae matching algorithms. This was attributed to purely local approach
of the encoding algorithm since it deals well with local distortions of a fingerprint but
lacks global coherency. In their follow up work [39], more discriminative information was
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added to distinguish impostors with high scores from genuine scores by using localization
information of vicinities which increased the global coherency.
In the spectral minutiae representation [16, 17], each minutia location was coded by
an isotropic two-dimensional Gaussian function in the spatial domain. Here, minutiae
were represented as a magnitude spectrum and their orientations were incorporated by
assigning each Gaussian a complex magnitude. Only the magnitude spectrum was con-
sidered and it was sampled on a log polar grid to obtain a fixed length vector. It is
possible to perform matching between two spectral minutiae vectors without aligning
them first since the magnitude spectrum is invariant to rotation and translation due
to the shift, scale, and rotation properties of the Fourier transform. However, in prac-
tice, alignment based on singular points (core and delta) is required to achieve a good
recognition performance [17] because a large rotation or translation may lead to partial
overlap between different impressions of the same finger. It should be noted that spec-
tral minutiae representation uses the global position and orientation information of the
minutiae thus already include relations of minutiae to each other.
In our study, we evaluate spectral minutiae representation in depth and propose the first
implementation of biometric hashing for spectral minutiae [40]. Next, we describe an
underlying framework that enables the generation of a novel fixed-length feature vector
representation for fingerprint minutiae. Also, a method based on asymmetric local-
ity sensitive hashing is proposed to generate binary strings from fixed-length minutiae
vectors.
Chapter 3
Biometric Hashing and Its
Entropy
Biometric hashing is a vector based template protection method that is used to secure
various biometric modalities such as fingerprint [7], face [9], palm [10], etc. In a typical
biometric hashing scheme, the input biometric modality is represented as a vector of real
numbers of length n, x ∈ Rn. After multiplying with a random matrix and applying a
threshold, this representation is converted to a binary string.
Biometric hashing (simply biohashing) schemes are simple yet powerful biometric tem-
plate protection methods [41–45]. Biohash is a binary and pseudo-random representation
of a biometric template and biometric hashing schemes perform an automatic verifica-
tion of a user based on his biohash (a binary string). Two inputs of a biometric hashing
scheme are: i) biometric template and ii) user specific secret key. A biometric feature
vector is transformed into another space using a pseudo-random set of vectors which
are generated from the user’s secret key. Then, the result is binarized to produce a
pseudo-random bit-string which is called the biohash. The random projection matrix is
unique and specific to each user and it can be stored in a USB token or a smartcard.
In a practical system, a user specific random matrix is calculated using a seed (a user
specific secret key) that is stored in a USB token or a smartcard microprocessor through
a pseudo random number generator. The seed is the same with that used during the
enrollment of a user and is different among different users and different applications [7].
This allows revocability of the subject’s biohash in case it is compromised. Also, the
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same biometric trait of a subject can be used in different biometric recognition systems
without constituting privacy threat as two biohashes of the same person with different
keys are unlinkable.
In an ideal case, the distance between the biohashes belonging to biometric templates of
the same user is expected to be relatively small. On the other hand, the distance between
the biohashes belonging to different users is expected to be sufficiently high which enables
higher recognition rates. The user is enrolled to the system at the enrollment stage. At
the authentication stage, the user provides his biometric data and secret key to the
system in order to prove his identity.
In the next section, we describe the random projection (RP) based biohashing scheme
proposed by Ngo et al. [7] for face verification.
3.1 Enrollment Stage
The first stage in a biometric recognition system is the enrollment stage in which a user
is introduced to the system for the first time. His biometric record is captured and
converted to a reference biometric template which will be compared to a fresh sample
at the authentication stage. This biometric template can be stored either in a central
database or a smart card that will be in possession of the user.
3.1.1 Feature Extraction
At this phase, face images that are collected during the enrollment stage are used as the
training set. The set has training face images belonging to registered users, Ii,j ∈ Rm×n
where i = 1, . . . ,K and K denotes the number of users, and j = 1, . . . , L and L denotes
the number of training images per user. Each face image is represented as a vector,
y ∈ R(mn)×1. Then, the Principle Component Analysis (PCA) [46] is applied to face
images in the training set for feature extraction:
x = A(y − µ), (3.1)
where A ∈ Rk×(mn) is the PCA matrix trained by the face images in the training set, µ is
the mean face vector, and x ∈ Rk×1 is the vector containing PCA coefficients (k < mn).
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3.1.2 Random Projection
At this phase, a pseudo random projection (RP) matrix, R ∈ R`×k, is generated to
transform the PCA coefficient vectors. The RP matrix elements are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d) and generated from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and unit variance by using a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) with a seed
derived from the user’s secret key. The RP matrix projects the PCA coefficients onto
an `-dimensional space:
z = Rx, (3.2)
where z ∈ R`×1 is an intermediate biohash vector.
3.1.3 Quantization
At this phase, elements of the intermediate biohash vector z are binarized with respect
to a threshold:
b (k) =

1, z (k) ≥ β,
0, otherwise,
(3.3)
where b ∈ {0, 1}` denotes the biohash vector of the user and β denotes the quantization
threshold which can be 0 (sign operator) or the mean value of the intermediate biohash
vector z, depending on the system design.
After enrollment, biometric hashes are stored in a database or in a smart card.
3.2 Authentication Stage
At the authentication stage of a biometric system, an identity claim of a user is evaluated
and a decision (YES/NO) is given depending on the result of this evaluation. The fresh
biometric sample of the claimer is matched against the enrollment record of the subject.
Authentication result of the system depends on the similarity (or distance) between
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Figure 3.1: Biometric hashing verification setup
these two biometric templates. Throughout this thesis, authentication and verification
are used interchangeably and both terms refer to a one-to-one matching.
At the authentication stage of the biometric hashing system, a claimer sends his face
image I˜ ∈ Rm×n and his secret key to the system. The system computes the claimer’s
test biometric hash vector by using the same procedures as in the enrollment phase.
The user is authenticated when the Hamming distance between benroll (which denotes
the biohash of the user generated at the enrollment stage) and bauth (which denotes the
biohash of the user generated at the authentication stage) is below a pre-determined
distance threshold  as follows:
n∑
k=1
benroll (k)⊕ bauth (k) ≤  (3.4)
where ⊕ denotes the binary XOR (exclusive OR) operator. The system computes the
Hamming distance between the test biometric hash vector and the claimed user’s refer-
ence biometric hash vector stored in the database (or in the smart card). If the Hamming
distance is below the pre-determined distance threshold, the claimer is accepted; other-
wise, the claimer is rejected (Figure 3.1).
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The remaining of this chapter presents the first successful theoretical evaluation of bio-
metric hashing as required for thorough analysis where the unpredictability of biohashes
generated by random projection (RP) based biohashing scheme is quantified via esti-
mated entropy. Since a random projection and quantization method is required in our
framework, the first study of Ngo et al. [9] among all other recent alternatives such as [47]
was chosen since none has an effect on our entropy estimation method. The amount of
information a biohash carries is quantitatively analyzed by measuring the entropy of a
biohash obtained from a face image. Furthermore, to assess to what extent a biohash is
unpredictable once the secret key of a user is stolen, the difference in the entropy of the
original biohash and the entropy of the one created by using the stolen key along with
the biometric feature of an arbitrary person is used.
We conduct experiments in a face verification set-up considering two different threat
scenarios. Our results shows that the entropy of a biohash is almost equal to its bit
length when the secret key of each user is kept safe. However, in the advanced threat
scenario where the secret key of a user is compromised, the discriminative effect of
the random projection is lost and the entropy of the biohash is limited to the entropy
of the biometric feature. This is consistent with the study of Adler et al. [48] which
shows that the biometric information for a person could be calculated by the relative
entropy between the feature distributions of that person and the population (practically
measured to be approximately 40 bits).
3.3 Entropy Prediction for Biohashing
The entropy of a random variable measures it uncertainty. In other words, it is a
measure of the average amount of information required to describe a random variable.
An important theoretical measure for biometric template protection methods is the
entropy loss or mutual information (defined as the difference between unconditional and
conditional entropies) [49]:
I(B;K) = H(B)−H(B|K), (3.5)
where H(B) is the entropy of biohash B and H(B|K) is the conditional entropy of B
where the corresponding secret key K is known (i.e., stolen by an adversary). In [15],
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the entropy of a biometric template is defined as the measure of the number of different
identities that are distinguishable by a biometric system and it is a powerful indicator
of its unpredictability. However, theoretical estimation methods are required to assess
the entropy of a biohash since how to calculate that entropy is not immediately clear.
One approach is to compute the bit-wise entropy of a biohash where the entropy of each
bit location is calculated using a large database of biohashes [50]. Since this approach
assumes that the bits of a biohash are independent and identically distributed, the
predicted entropy is overestimated.
3.3.1 Daugman’s Entropy Estimation
Daugman proposed a method for estimating the entropy of iris phase codes [1]. Iris
phase codes, bit strings of length 2048, are compared using the normalized Hamming
distance and the ratio of the number of disagreeing bits to the number of total bits are
used to assess the degree of dissimilarity between two bit strings. A low dissimilarity
ratio between two iris codes are accepted as belonging to the same eye whereas as from
different eyes if it is close to 0.5.
Comparing bits corresponds to a Bernoulli trial and a binomial distribution is the dis-
tribution of the sum of n Bernoulli trials, each with the same probability. By observing
the inter-class distance distribution over a large iris database, Daugman concluded that
the distribution of the normalized Hamming distances between iris codes are normalized
binomial with an observed mean of 0.499. Correlated Bernoulli trials reduce the effective
number of trials but the output is still binomially distributed [51]. In iris phase codes,
only a small number of bits are mutually independent, therefore the effective number
of bits is not 2048 (number of bits in a phase code) but 249 and this corresponds to
the entropy of an iris phase code [1]. In Figure 3.2, the observed distribution is plotted
against the theoretical normalized binomial (the solid curve), which shows the close fit
between them.
3.3.2 Entropy of Biometric Hashing
Biohashes are bit strings as iris codes and are compared via Hamming distance dur-
ing authentication. In this work, we utilize these similarities between biohashes and
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Hamming distances of interclass comparisons for iris phase
codes [1]
iris codes. We use the same methodology of fitting a binomial distribution to imposter
distance data and to calculate the entropy of biohashes via the degree of freedom in
the corresponding binomial distribution. A binomial distribution is fit to the obtained
inter-class distances (i.e., imposter comparisons) as follows. Using the imposter com-
parisons between biohashes of different subjects, the observed mean of the normalized
Hamming distances (µd) and observed standard deviation (σd) are calculated from data.
This corresponds to a binomial distribution with Nb = µd(1 − µd)/σ2d. The theoretical
binomial distribution has the functional form:
f(m) =
Nb!
m!(Nb −m)!µ
m
d (1− µd)(N−m), (3.6)
where m/Nb (m = 1, . . . , Nb) is the outcome fraction of Nb Bernoulli trials, for our case,
it is the normalized Hamming distance for imposter matches. The number Nb (degree
of freedom) of the binomial distribution is the predicted entropy of biohashes.
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3.4 Experiments and Results
We implement the entropy estimation method described in Section 3.3.2 on a face verifi-
cation set-up considering two different threat scenarios. The naive threat model assumes
that an adversary has very limited information about the system and he can only per-
form a brute force attack using an arbitrary face information and a random secret key.
In the advanced threat model, essential details of the algorithms, properties of biometric
data as well as the secret keys of users are assumed to be known by the attacker. So,
the attacker can create biohashes using any face image and the secret key of the user
that he tries to impersonate.
3.4.1 Experimental Setup and Database
In our experiments, we use the BioSecure-ds2 [52] face database. It consists of 210
users, equally balanced by gender. 8 standard camera acquisitions per person (captured
in two separate sessions) are used in our experiments. PCA coefficients extracted from
detected face images are used for matching. The faces are automatically detected using
Viola-Jones face detector [53] and resized to 64 × 64 pixels. In order to normalize a
gray-scale face image, its mean intensity value is extracted from each pixel and each
pixel is divided by its standard deviation.
1024-dimensional PCA coefficients are calculated for all 8 samples of 210 subjects (a
total of 1680 (210 × 8) face images). PCA training is done using the first session im-
ages only. Applying the standard biohashing procedure, a bit-string is created through
matrix-vector product between the pseudo-random matrix and 1024-dimensional PCA
coefficients vector. The resulting vector is then quantized using a predefined threshold.
One can obtain a bit-string of any length according to the memory and security require-
ments of the system. In order to demonstrate that the accuracy of the entropy analysis
does not depend on biohash length, we experiment with three test lengths, namely 128,
256 and 512.
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Table 3.1: Mean value, standard deviations, and degrees of freedom for different bit
lengths under both scenarios
Bit Length Mean (µd)
Standard Degree of
Deviation (σd) Freedom (Nb)
Naive Model
128 0.5000 0.0443 127
256 0.4997 0.0313 254
512 0.5001 0.0223 504
Advanced
128 0.3653 0.0862 31
Threat Model
256 0.3685 0.0792 37
512 0.3836 0.0761 40
3.4.2 Entropy Prediction Under Naive Threat Model
In our verification setting, all possible combinations of matching genuine pairs are used
and the first sample of each subject is chosen for imposter matches (5880 (210×8×7/2)
genuine comparisons and 21945 (210×209/2) imposter comparisons). For imposter com-
parisons, the observed mean normalized Hamming distance with its standard deviation
and the degree of freedom of its corresponding binomial distribution for each test length
are given in Table 3.1.
The figures in the first column of Figure 3.3 illustrate the distribution of imposter dis-
tances under the naive threat model for biohashes with three test lengths. The histogram
of the interclass comparison distribution (shown in blue) forms a perfect binomial dis-
tribution with parameters µd = 0.5001, σd = 0.0223, and Nb = 504 (for 512 bits) as
shown by the solid red line. The small difference between the actual bit length and the
predicted entropy is due to database artifacts and it is expected that as the number of
imposter comparisons gets higher, the ratio estimated entropy in bits/bit length would
reach 1.
3.4.3 Entropy Prediction Under Advanced Threat Model
In the advanced threat model, the adversary is assumed to have full knowledge of the
system and the secret keys of all users. The same experimental set-up of the naive model
is used in order to predict the entropy of biohashes. For a biohash of a valid system user,
an imposter biohash is created using the secret key of that user and a biometric template
of an arbitrary user. Thus, unlike the naive model, interclass distances are calculated
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of normalized Hamming distances of interclass comparisons
of biohashes with various lengths and different threat models - first column: naive
threat model and second column: advanced threat model
between two biohashes that are created using the same secret key for different users.
The graphs in the second column of Figure 3.3 illustrate the distribution of imposter
distances for biohashes with various lengths. The observed mean of the distribution
deviates from 0.5 and gets closer to the observed mean of genuine comparisons as the
imposter distances get smaller. Since the distribution of genuine results is not involved
in the entropy estimation, it is not discussed here. Thus, the comparison of genuine
templates is not presented here for brevity.
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This effect is also evident in the results given in Table 3.1. As compared to the naive
model, the degree of freedom is much lower than the actual bit length and the predicted
entropy decreases dramatically for all biohash lengths. For example, the entropy drops
from 504 to 40 for biohashes of length 512. We argue that our results in naive and ad-
vanced scenarios are generalizable when the database is large and representative enough.
For all biohash lengths, the estimated entropy in this threat model is between 31 and
40 bits which is consistent with the face entropy of 40 bits reported in [48].
3.5 Discussion
Existing theoretical evaluations of biometric protection methods cannot be used for
assessing biohashing methods. In this work, we have described a systematic approach
to quantify the unpredictability of random projection-based biohashing scheme by using
entropy as a measure. Since feature extraction and feature normalization methods are
not in our scope, we have focused only on quantitative evaluation of random projection
and quantization steps. We have estimated the entropy of a biohash in terms of bits via
the degree of freedom of binomial distribution under two predefined threat models [8].
Our experiments in a face verification setup have demonstrated that the entropy of a
biohash is almost equal to its bit-length as expected when there is no attack against
the system (the naive threat model). On the other hand, the entropy and hence the
unpredictability of biohashes decrease when the attacker knows the secret key of the
user that he tries to impersonate (the advanced threat model). Thus, the amount of
information kept secret in a biohash becomes more likely to be predicted in such cases.
Potential future research directions on entropy of biohashes can be summarized as fol-
lows. Novel random projection methods should be studied in order to decrease the
entropy loss between the naive and advanced threat models. In addition, other applica-
ble privacy and security metrics could be investigated, such as the mutual information of
hashes of different users (i.e., the entropy of one hash conditional to another hash). One
other possible research direction would be to study the suitability of universal entropy
estimators (e.g., Coron’s or Maurer’s [54]) to biohashes.
Chapter 4
Practical Security and Privacy
Attacks Against Biometric
Hashing Using Sparse Recovery
In this chapter, we present four different novel optimization-based methods that aim to
predict the feature vector and/or the biometric image itself. Here, our assumption is
that an adversary, who gains access to the biohash vector of a valid system user and
the corresponding secret key, estimates a new real-valued feature vector from the binary
biohash and uses it to authenticate to the system. In this study, we focus on novel
feature estimation methods. The first two proposed methods are based on one-bit com-
pressive sensing approach and related feature reconstruction algorithms. Compressive
sensing is a new signal acquisition technology with the potential of reducing the number
of measurements required to acquire signals that are sparse or compressible in some do-
main. Rather than uniformly sampling the signal, compressive sensing computes inner
products with a randomized dictionary of test functions. The signal is then recovered
by a convex optimization which ensures that the recovered signal is consistent with the
measurements. One-bit measurements is a more restricted case in which only the sign
information of the random measurements is preserved. In our framework, we solve the
biohash invertibility problem by using two different reconstruction approaches, namely,
linear programming [55] and binary iterative hard thresholding [56].
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Figure 4.1: Overview of a biometric hashing system
We also discuss minimum norm solutions for approximating feature vectors from bio-
hashes and present L2 and L1 norm minimization for this problem. Finally, we describe
the rainbow attack to compromise the security of a biometric hashing scheme. Rainbow
attack is different from feature approximation methods and does not aim at predicting
a new feature vector. With the help of a huge database of biometric features along
with the biohash vector of a valid user and the corresponding secret key, a biometric
image that creates a sufficiently close biohash to the desired one is found and used for
illegitimate authentication.
We propose practical attacks and study their performances instead of using theoreti-
cal metrics. Furthermore, we analyze the privacy issues related to the invertibility of
biohash templates and, as a case study, we visually inspect reconstructed face images
of the subjects. Authentication performance of the reconstructed feature vectors in a
conventional verification setup, in which the plain features are used for matching, is also
investigated.
4.1 Proposed Feature Approximation Methods from Bio-
hash
In this section, we introduce intrusion attacks via reconstruction of the biometric fea-
ture vector from biohashes. In this context, intrusion is defined as gaining access to a
biometric recognition system by presenting falsified authentication data to the system
[11] (see Figure 4.1).
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We use the following notation throughout our analysis of biometric hashing scheme: b
represents the biohash vector of a valid system user and it is obtained by an adversary to
perform intrusion attacks through feature approximation, R is the user specific random
projection matrix and known to the adversary, x is the original biometric feature vector
that b is created from and it is neither known nor accessible by the attacker, and xˆ is the
feature vector (or pre-image) that is approximated through inversion of b. Note that, xˆ
does not necessarily correspond to a valid biometric feature vector (i.e., PCA coefficients
for faces or fingerprint minutiae information). However, using xˆ, one can produce a
biohash vector that allows unauthorized access to the biometric system (Figure 4.2).
Once xˆ is obtained, an attacker might also reconstruct the biometric modality and use
it for illegitimate access to a system, i.e., in our case this is the face image (it is also
assumed that the attacker knows the PCA matrix used in feature extraction). In this
study, we consider that the intrusion to the system can happen in two ways before the
random projection step. An attacker either provides a digital face image (reconstructed
face image) to the system prior to the feature extraction step or uses the approximated
feature vector as input to the random projection.
The success probability of such an attack to the biometric hashing system can be mea-
sured as P (d(sign(Rxˆ),b) < ) 1, where d(·) is the Hamming distance between two
biohashes (i.e., the number of disagreeing bits). This metric is also called the Intrusion
Rate due to Inversion for the Same biometric system (IRIS) by Nagar et al. [11]. In
1This probability is estimated by using the false accept rate of the system when the threshold is 
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the next sections, we present various methods to obtain a feature vector xˆ that allows
illegitimate access to a biometric system given b and the transformation parameters.
4.1.1 One-bit Compressive Sensing Approach
One-bit compressive sensing studies efficient acquisition of sparse (or more structured)
signals via linear measurement systems and only 1 bit per measurement is retained.
While the key application of this problem has been in the area of signal acquisition, it
has also found applications in several learning related problems. Boufounos et al. [57]
introduced the problem of one-bit compressive sensing where only 1 bit of the linear mea-
surement, specifically its sign is observed. Random projection based biometric hashing
can be viewed in the same context as one-bit compressive sensing. If the threshold used
in quantization of the projected signal is 0 (such that the sign of the signal is kept),
each bit of a biohash is the sign of the inner product of the feature vector (x) with a
measurement vector (in biometric hashing, each row of the random projection matrix
(R):
bi = sign(〈Ri,x〉). (4.1)
The biometric hashing procedure is compactly expressed using:
b = sign(Rx), (4.2)
where b is the biohash vector, R is the matrix representing the random projection
matrix (the measurement system), and the 1-bit quantization function sign(.) is applied
element-wise to the vector Rx.
For consistent reconstruction from 1-bit measurements, the measurements are treated
as sign constraints that are enforced in the reconstruction to recover the signal. In the
reconstruction, L1 norm of the feature vector is minimized to obtain a sparse solution.
When the PCA coefficients of face images are analyzed, it is noted that most of the
coefficients are small in magnitude and only about 25% of them is enough to obtain
∼ 70% of the total energy as seen in Figure 4.3. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that PCA vectors are sparse. Also, as stated by Candes and Wakin [58], ”compressive
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Figure 4.3: (a) Cumulative energy contained in PCA coefficients. (b) Distribution of
1024 dimensional PCA coefficients of a sample from the database.
sampling exploits the fact that many natural signals are sparse in the sense that they
have concise representations when expressed in the proper basis”. Even if the original
signal is not sparse, a basis can be found in which most coefficients are small, and the
relatively few large coefficients capture most of the information and this allows for the
use of sparse recovery in the problem of biohash inversion.
In addition, to enforce reconstruction at a non-trivial solution, one needs to artificially
resolve the amplitude ambiguity. Thus, an energy constraint is imposed that the recon-
structed signal lies on the unit L2-sphere:
‖x‖2 =
(∑
i
x2i
)1/2
= 1. (4.3)
The signal on the unit sphere that is consistent with the measurements is found by
solving:
xˆ = arg min
x
‖x‖1
s.t. sign(Rxˆ) ≡ b
and ‖xˆ‖2 = 1.
(4.4)
As the compressive sensing measurements are quantized to one bit, it is clear that the
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scale (absolute amplitude) of the signal is lost and it is not immediately evident that
the remaining information is enough for signal reconstruction. Nonetheless, there is
strong empirical evidence stating that signal reconstruction is possible [57]. One-bit
compressive sensing by linear programming [55] and binary iterative hard thresholding
[56] are two theoretical reconstruction methods that we implement separately for ob-
taining inverse images of biohashes and finding biometric feature vectors that provide
biohash vectors which are acceptable by the verification system (i.e., with a distance to
the original biohash vector that is less than a threshold).
4.1.1.1 One-bit Compressive Sensing by Linear Programming
The study in [55] has showed that x can be accurately estimated from extremely quan-
tized measurement vector in (4.2). Note that, b contains no information about the
magnitude of x and only the normalized vector x/‖x‖2 can be recovered. It has been
shown that the signal can be accurately recovered by solving the following convex min-
imization program:
min ‖xˆ‖1
s.t. BRxˆ ≥ 0
and ‖Rxˆ‖1 = m,
(4.5)
where B = diag(b).
The first constraint, BRxˆ ≥ 0, keeps the solution consistent with the original biohash
vector and it is defined by the relation 〈Ri, xˆ〉 · bi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m where Ri is
the ith row of the random projection matrix R. The second constraint in the original
problem definition (4.4) contains L2-norm which is a quadratic term and can be replaced
with the linear L1-norm, so that the optimization becomes a linear program. The second
constraint, ‖Rxˆ‖1 = m, serves to prevent the program from returning zero solution and
it is linear as it can be represented as one linear equation
∑m
i=1 bi〈Ri, xˆ〉 = m, where m
is the length of the biohash vector. Therefore, (4.5) is a convex minimization problem
and can easily be represented as a linear program (see Algorithm 4.1).
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Algorithm 4.1 Approximate biometric feature vector xˆ using Linear Programming
Input: b, R
Output: xˆ
calculate A such that Axˆ ≥ 0 using b and R
calculate Aeq such that Aeqxˆ = m using R
set f to calculate L1 norm of xˆ
use simplex method to solve for xˆ
4.1.1.2 Binary Iterative Hard Thresholding
Binary iterative hard thresholding (BIHT) [56] is a modification of iterative hard thresh-
olding (IHT) which is a real-valued algorithm designed for compressive sensing [59].
Proposed for the recovery of K-sparse signals, IHT algorithm consists of two steps. The
first step is a gradient descent to reduce the least squares objective ‖y −Rx‖22/2. At
each iteration, IHT proceeds by setting al+1 = xl + RT (y − Rx). The second step
imposes a sparse signal model by selecting the K elements of al+1 that are largest in
magnitude.
BIHT algorithm modifies the first step of IHT and minimizes a consistency-enforcing
objective. Given an initial estimate x0 = 0 and 1-bit measurements b, at each iteration
l, BIHT computes:
al+1 = xl +
τ
2
RT (b− sign(Rxl))
xl+1 = ηK(a
l+1),
(4.6)
where τ is a scalar that controls the gradient descent step size, and the function ηK
computes the best K-term approximation of al+1 (see Algorithm 4.2). In our experi-
ments, we choose K as 25% of the feature vector length, i.e., K = 50 for 200 dimensional
feature vectors and K = 256 for 1024 dimensional feature vectors.
Algorithm 4.2 Approximate biometric feature vector xˆ using BIHT
Input: b, R, K
Output: xˆ
initialize x0 all zeros
while |b− sign(Rxl)|1 > 0 do
al+1 = xl + τ2R
T (b− sign(Rxl))
sort elements of al+1 and set the all but the largest K components to 0,
end while
set xˆ← al+1
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4.1.2 Minimum L1 and L2 Norm Solutions
In this section, we present and discuss minimum-norm based feature reconstruction
methods for biohashes in addition to the solutions we propose in one-bit compressive
sensing framework.
Biohash vector is obtained through quantization from an intermediate vector z which is
the output of a random projection, i.e., z = Rx. If one can invert the quantization step
and find an intermediate vector zˆ that produces the biohash vector after quantization,
a minimum norm solution can be used to estimate the biometric feature vector (xˆ) as:
min ‖xˆ‖n s.t. zˆ = Rxˆ. (4.7)
In this work, we study minimum norm solutions for n = 1 and n = 2, namely L1 and
L2 norms.
4.1.2.1 Inversion of the Quantization Step
Solutions in one-bit compressive sensing framework implicitly handle the quantization
of the randomly projected feature z within the optimization process. However, L1 and
L2 norm-based reconstruction requires an explicit inversion of the thresholding step of
the biometric hashing scheme.
In order to invert the quantization process, an adversary who possesses the biohash (b) of
a valid system user and corresponding random projection matrix (R), uses an arbitrary
biometric feature vector xf to simulate the biometric hashing procedure through random
projection and obtain an intermediate vector zf = Rxf . Next, the sample mean and
standard deviation of zf are calculated, µ and σ respectively. Mapping the elements of
the compromised biohash vector b from {0,1} to {-1,1} is performed as:
bˆ(i) =

1, b(i) = 1,
−1, b(i) = 0,
(4.8)
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where bˆ is the mapped biohash vector. Finally, using the values calculated from the
arbitrary biometric features, the intermediate vector zˆ is estimated as:
zˆ(i) = µ+ bˆ(i)σ. (4.9)
To be consistent with the solutions described in one-bit compressive sensing approach,
we assume that the signs of elements of the intermediate vector z is used to obtain the
biohash (i.e., the threshold at the quantization step is 0). However, various quantization
methods and thresholding mechanisms are proposed in the literature for biometric hash-
ing, one of them being the mean value of the intermediate vector and another one being
its median value. If the system uses the mean value of the intermediate vector as the
quantization threshold, the mean value of the zf can be calculated. In our experiments,
the threshold equals to 0, thus the mean value is not used, and the intermediate vector
is computed as zˆ(i) = bˆ(i)σ.
4.1.2.2 Minimum L2 Norm Solution
Once an adversary creates an intermediate vector zˆ, the following L2 norm minimiza-
tion provides an estimate feature vector xˆ that is consistent with the observation b =
sign(Rxˆ).
min ‖xˆ‖2 s.t. zˆ = Rxˆ. (4.10)
The closed form solution that gives the minimum L2 norm for the estimated feature
vector is given by the MoorePenrose pseudo-inverse. For linear systems Ax = b with
non-unique solutions (i.e., under-determined systems), the pseudo inverse is used to
reconstruct the solution of minimum Euclidean norm ‖x‖2 among all solutions. So the
solution to the above minimization problem to estimate the feature vector from biohash
b is calculated as xˆ = R†zˆ.
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4.1.2.3 Minimum L1 Norm Solution
Similar to the minimum L2 norm solution, minimum L1 norm solution aims at solving
the following minimization problem.
min ‖xˆ‖1 s.t. zˆ = Rxˆ. (4.11)
In one-bit compressive sensing approach by linear programming, L1 norm of the esti-
mated feature vector is minimized according to the constraints that include the quantiza-
tion step. However, minimum L1 norm solution handles the quantization step separately
and the minimization is carried out over the intermediate real-valued vector zˆ. The min-
imization problem still has linear constraints and minimization of L1 norm can easily be
expressed as a linear program and solved accordingly.
For both L1 and L2 norm minimizations, if the PCA dimension is less than the biohash
length (i.e., if the random projection step does not reduce the dimension), the linear
system is over-determined and an exact solution might not possibly exist (i.e., solutions
could be inconsistent with the observations). Instead, it is possible to minimize the
residual between the observation and the solution (i.e., ‖zˆ − Rxˆ‖n) and to obtain a
feature vector that provides biohashes that is close to the original one.
4.1.3 Reconstructing the Face Image
As long as the feature extraction step uses an orthogonal transformation matrix, it is
possible to invert the feature extraction process simply by using the pseudo inverse of
the transformation matrix and a face image can be reconstructed easily. The Principal
Component Analysis uses an orthogonal transformation, which means that the columns
of the PCA matrix are perpendicular to each other and hence one can reconstruct the
face image yˆ from xˆ by using the property of an orthogonal matrix A† = AT :
yˆ = AT xˆ + µy, (4.12)
where A ∈ <k×(mn) is the PCA matrix, A† is the pseudo-inverse of A, and µy is the
mean face vector.
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4.1.4 Other Thresholding Methods - Apart from the “sign” Operator
In cases where the thresholding after the random projection step is not the sign operator,
some alternatives can also be formulated within our proposed framework. Assuming that
an adversary has the full knowledge of the system, i.e., the specific thresholding method,
he can also invert the biohashes.
4.1.4.1 Fixed or User Specific Threshold
Apart from using the sign operator, one can use a pre-defined fixed threshold or user
specific threshold, i.e., b = sign(Rx−T) where T denotes the threshold. Entries of T
can be the same number or different numbers at each dimension. T can also be specific
to each user (it is show as Ti where i denotes the subject number). By augmenting the
threshold vector to the random projection matrix, Rˆ =
[
R −Ti
]
, we can reformulate
the biohashing operation as b = sign
(
Rˆ
[
x 1
])
and perform the same operations for
inverting biohashes.
4.1.4.2 Mean Value is the Threshold
An alternative way of thresholding the intermediate vector is to use the mean value of
the intermediate biohash vector z = Rx as the threshold and to calculate the biohash
vector as
b = sign(Rx−mean(Rx)). (4.13)
Thresholding step can be integrated into the random projection step by using the mod-
ified random projection matrix Rˆ:
Rˆ =
[
R− 1 ·R
N
]
, (4.14)
where N is the biohash length, 1 is a matrix of ones, and the biohash vector becomes
b = sign(Rˆx). An adversary can use the modified matrix Rˆ and all inversion methods
that we discuss are still valid in this setup.
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4.2 Rainbow Attack
In the previous section, we propose four different optimization methods for recovering
features from an original biohash vector that is stolen by an attacker. Having the cor-
responding secret key and using the knowledge of system parameters, one can estimate
a real valued feature vector xˆ with the consistency criterion such that b = sign(Rxˆ) in
order to gain illegitimate access to the biometric system. Rainbow attack is different
from these methods in the sense that it does not aim at inverting a biohash vector to
obtain a valid pre-image. Instead, using the knowledge of the system and the secret
key of the user, with the help of a large database of biometric features, an adversary
may find a face image which, when combined with the secret key of the user, result in
a biohash vector that is sufficiently close to the original biohash b.
In the cryptography literature, a rainbow table is a precomputed table for reversing
cryptographic hash functions, usually for cracking password hashes. Any computer
system that requires password authentication must contain a database of passwords,
either hashed or in plaintext, and utilize different methods to store passwords. Because
the tables are vulnerable to thefts, storing passwords as plain texts is dangerous. Most
databases therefore store a cryptographic hash of a user’s password in the database.
When a user enters his password for authentication, it is hashed and compared to the
stored password entry of that user (which is also hashed before being stored in the
database). If the two hashes match, the access is granted. A Rainbow Table is a
large dictionary with pre-calculated hashes and the passwords from which they were
calculated. When an attacker steals a long list of password hashes from the system,
he can quickly check if any of them are in the Rainbow Table. If that is the case, the
Rainbow Table will also contain the original string that they were hashed from.
A biometric authentication system that protects biometric templates using biometric
hashing methods operates in a similar way; the biohash of a user is stored and compared
to the query biohash during verification. If an adversary having a large database of
biometric features of various users, steals the biohash of a system user and knows his
secret key, the adversary can compute biohashes of each biometric feature in the database
using the random projection matrix of the user and create a table of biohashes and
their corresponding feature vectors. If any of the biohashes in the table is sufficiently
Practical Security and Privacy Attacks Against Biometric Hashing Using Sparse
Recovery 43
close to the stolen biohash (i.e., their Hamming distance is less than a threshold), the
corresponding feature vector can be used for illegitimate access to the biometric system.
Different from previously described attacks which try to approximate a feature vector
that gives a close biohash vector to the stolen one, the rainbow attack is a practical attack
that aims to compromise the security of a biometric hashing scheme. Furthermore,
assuming that one authentication factor (the secret key of a user) is known, the rainbow
attack also provides privacy threat since look alike faces can be found.
4.3 Experiments and Results
In this section, the performance of our proposed attack methods are analyzed and dis-
cussed. The database that is used and the experimental set-up are described, and attack
models and their corresponding error rates are given.
4.3.1 The Database and Experimental Set-up
In order to provide the performance analysis of the security of biohashes based on the
feature approximation methods, we implement our proposed methods on a face verifica-
tion setup. We obtain face verification results on the BioSecure-ds2 face database [52].
The same database set-up with Section 3.4 is followed. M -dimensional PCA coefficients
are calculated for all 8 samples of 210 subjects. In our results, we present results using
bit-strings of length 128, 256, 512 and 1024.
In a verification setting, we use all possible combinations for matching genuine pairs and
the first sample of each subject is chosen for imposter matches (5880 (210 × 8 × 7/2)
genuine comparisons and 21945 (210×209/2) imposter comparisons) in order to evaluate
the performance of the biometric hashing scheme. For validating the consistency of
approximated features using the proposed methods, we compare the biohashes created
from these features with the original biohashes leading to one imposter score for each
sample in the database (1680 imposter matches). Equal error rates (EER) in each case
are reported.
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4.3.2 The Performance of the Biometric Hashing Scheme
First, we apply the general biometric hashing scheme described in Chapter 3 on the
BioSecure-ds2 face database. For comparison, we also include face verification results
of PCA vectors by using Euclidean distance as the matching method. The equal error
rates for this method before applying biometric hashing to PCA vectors are 11.893% and
12.482% for vectors of length 200 and 1024, respectively. Equal error rates for biohash
vectors of various lengths are given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Equal Error Rates (%) for biohash vectors of different lengths
PCA 200 PCA 1024
Bit
Biohash
Biohash
Biohash
Biohash
Length (Stolen Key) (Stolen Key)
128 6.295 12.571 6.593 13.565
256 4.570 11.457 4.813 12.216
512 4.137 11.595 4.328 11.634
1024 2.875 11.118 2.934 11.553
For all bit lengths, the performance of the biometric hashing scheme is better than the
baseline PCA approach and lower EERs are obtained with the protected templates. In
cases where an adversary steals the secret key of a user but does not possess the claimed
person’s biometric information, the adversary sends his own biometric (or an arbitrary
biometric) and the secret key of the genuine user in order to be authenticated. This is
a serious threat to the system as the pseudo-random vectors generated using the secret
key have a considerable influence on the generated bit string, therefore on the matching
score. However, even if the attacker knows the secret key, the verification accuracy of
the biometric hashing system is still in the same range with the performance of the
unprotected PCA vectors.
One obvious addition to the biometric hashing scheme is the direct comparison of secret
keys (i.e., the one stored during enrollment and the one presented during authentication)
prior to biohash comparison. This way 0% (zero) EER is achieved if the attacker does
not have the secret key of a valid user. The error rates presented in Table 4.1 are the
results of biohash comparison and if key checking mechanism is applied as illustrated
in Figure 3.1, the EERs for the first scenario would be 0%. So that, here we study the
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added security coming from the biometrics with the use of biohashes in cases where an
attacker obtains the secret key.
4.3.3 The Performance of the Feature Approximation from Biohash
Methods
Since the database that we use has 1680 samples from 210 subjects, using their PCA
coefficients and secret keys of each subject, we create 1680 biohashes, each corresponding
to a different sample. It is assumed that an adversary obtains the biohash and the secret
key of a user and with this knowledge he aims to find a feature vector by inverting the
biohash. With this new feature vector, a new biohash can be calculated and used for
authentication purposes. For each biohash in the database, we obtain a new feature
vector and create its corresponding biohash. We use the new biohash to perform an
imposter attack to the original one and we do not attack to other genuine samples. We
use all possible combinations to match genuine pairs (5880 (210 × 8 × 7/2)) and the
number of imposter comparisons is 1680 (one for each biohash). The performance of
each method is reported in terms of the equal error rate (EER) and higher EER shows
the success of the attacker (i.e., 100% EER means that the inversion of all biohashes in
the database is successful and the approximated features provide biohash that matches
with the original one).
In order to evaluate the security that biometric hashing provides, we follow three con-
secutive scenarios:
Advanced Attack Model (AAM): The attacker, who knows the system details
and possesses the biohash of a user and his secret key, calculates an estimate feature
vector. Using this feature vector and the secret key of the subject, a new biohash is
created and compared with the original one.
Security After Key Change (SAKC): Upon the detection of a security breach,
the secret key of the user is changed by the system administrator. Using the previous
biometric data, a new biohash is created from the new secret key and stored as the new
gallery template in the system. The adversary does not have access to neither the new
secret key nor the new biohash. The adversary makes an authentication attempt using
Practical Security and Privacy Attacks Against Biometric Hashing Using Sparse
Recovery 46
the feature vector found in the advanced attack model and the previous (or an arbitrary)
secret key. It should be noted that, these errors are available only when the system does
not perform key checking prior to biohash comparison. As the attacker does not know
the secret key of the user, the EER in a key-checking system is 0%.
However, for the sake of completeness, a no key-checking system is also considered and
EERs in this case are also reported. EERs presented in Table 4.2 correspond to the
attack in which the adversary has the true (original) biometric features but does not
possess the associated secret key. These numbers provide a lower bound on the long-
term security error, where the secret key of the user is changed and is not known to the
attacker.
Table 4.2: Equal Error Rates (%) when the adversary has the true biometric features
but does not possess the associated secret key
PCA Biohash Length
dimension 128 256 512 1024
200 6.199 4.290 4.243 2.917
1024 6.497 4.902 4.375 3.044
Attack in the Long-term (ALT): The adversary obtains the new secret key of the
user but not the new biohash. Using the feature vector found in the advanced attack
model and the new secret key, the adversary makes an authentication attempt. This is
different from the advanced attack model in the sense that the biohash vector of the user
is not known to the adversary and the authentication attempt is performed using the
approximated feature vector which is obtained from the previous biohash of the user.
4.3.3.1 Results for One-bit Compressive Sensing Approaches
We use two different feature approximation methods, namely linear programming (LP)
and binary iterative hard thresholding (BIHT), in the one-bit compressive sensing frame-
work. The success rates of both methods are presented in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. For
the advanced attack model, the number of exact reconstructions, i.e., the number of esti-
mated features that provide the exact same biohashes (such that the Hamming distance
between the original biohash and the forged biohash is 0) is 1680 for all bit lengths. For
every sample in the database, regardless of the PCA dimension, both methods are able
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to find a feature vector that provides the exact same biohash and that is also reflected
by 100% EERs.
Table 4.3: Equal Error Rates (%) for one-bit compressive sensing approaches - linear
programming (LP) method
PCA Bit Length AAM SAKC ALT
200
128 100.00 7.262 48.333
256 100.00 5.225 65.570
512 100.00 4.018 78.958
1024 100.00 3.308 89.987
1024
128 100.00 7.530 40.187
256 100.00 5.128 53.342
512 100.00 4.286 68.907
1024 100.00 3.444 80.863
Table 4.4: Equal Error Rates (%) for one-bit compressive sensing approaches - BIHT
method
PCA Bit Length AAM SAKC ALT
200
128 100.00 7.381 33.767
256 100.00 4.851 49.388
512 100.00 3.958 74.809
1024 100.00 3.367 90.536
1024
128 100.00 6.667 16.314
256 100.00 5.306 19.887
512 100.00 4.252 28.759
1024 100.00 3.474 47.653
In the security after key change scenario, when the secret key of the user is changed
but not known to the adversary, EERs are in the same line with the cases where the
adversary has access only to one of the factors, either true biometric or true secret key
(see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). In the attack in the long term (ALT) scenario, it is possible
for the attacker to have unauthorized access to the system most of the time, especially
if the PCA length is shorter and the biohash length is longer (see the ALT column in
Tables 4.3 and 4.4).
Values of the intermediate vector z = Rx which are very close to the threshold, e.g.,
values z that are close to zero for the sign operator, lead to numerical inconsistencies
about the inequality criteria of the linear program (i.e., BRx ≥ 0) and can be solved
by replacing the inequality constraint with BRx ≥ , where  is the minimum positive
number available in MATLAB (machine epsilon).
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4.3.3.2 Results for Minimum Norm Solutions
The same set of experiments on the invertibility of biohashes is conducted using the
proposed minimum norm solutions (see Table 4.5 and Table 4.6). For biohashes created
from PCA vector of length 1024, both methods are able to find a pre-hash vector that
can be used to create the same biohash for each sample in the database. As in the
one-bit compressive sensing approach, the number of exact reconstructions is also 1680
in this case. However, when less number of PCA coefficients are used in the system (i.e.,
the PCA feature vectors are 200 dimensional), there is a slight decrease in the equal
error rates. Biohashes created from the estimated feature vectors are not exactly same
with the original ones (i.e., the Hamming distance between them is greater than zero)
which is reflected by the slight deviation from 100% EER.
Table 4.5: Equal Error Rates (%) for minimum norm solutions - L2 norm
PCA Bit Length AAM SAKC ALT
200
128 100.00 7.113 31.233
256 99.843 5.196 34.753
512 99.239 4.018 72.513
1024 98.444 3.219 86.599
1024
128 100.00 7.117 17.623
256 100.00 5.544 21.003
512 100.00 4.256 28.703
1024 100.00 3.474 36.947
Table 4.6: Equal Error Rates (%) for minimum norm solutions - L1 norm
PCA Bit Length AAM SAKC ALT
200
128 100.00 6.815 30.965
256 97.113 5.106 28.563
512 92.491 3.839 61.173
1024 92.751 3.431 77.564
1024
128 100.00 6.577 17.534
256 100.00 5.723 20.765
512 100.00 4.196 28.346
1024 100.00 3.474 36.947
In the SAKC scenario, the performances of minimum norm solutions are similar to
the one-bit compressive sensing solutions. If the new key of the user is stolen (the ALT
scenario), one-bit compressive sensing approaches provide significantly higher error rates
which shows the success of the attack method.
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Figure 4.4: DET curves for the proposed methods under the scenario Attack in the
Long-Term. (a) Reconstruction of 200 dimensional PCA feature vectors from biohash
of length 1024-bits. (b) Reconstruction of 1024 dimensional PCA feature vectors from
biohash of length 1024-bits.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the detection error tradeoff curves for the attacks using the pro-
posed methods under the ALT scenario (together with the results of the the study
in [11]). Table 4.7 shows the corresponding FAR1000 values (False Reject Rates when
the FAR = 10−3). The attack performance of the reconstructed feature vectors from
biohashes of 1024-bits can be compared among different methods. For brevity, we do
not include all results for different biohash lengths.
Table 4.7: FAR1000 values for the proposed methods under the scenario Attack in
the Long-Term.
Method 200→ 1024 1024→ 1024
LP 97.9932 95.9864
BIHT 97.6190 66.1565
L2 94.1190 54.7789
L1 89.3027 54.7789
A special case of solving the norm-minimization problem is when the PCA feature vector
dimension is equal to the length of biohash in bits. In approximating the 1024 dimen-
sional PCA vector from biohash of length 1024 bits, there is a single unique solution.
However, the condition number of the random projection matrix is so high and this leads
to inaccurate solutions. To improve the solution by decreasing the condition number,
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we add the 20% of the maximum singular value of the matrix R to all singular values.
This way, the condition number of R decreases by ∼ 102.
4.3.3.3 Computation Times for the Proposed Feature Approximation Meth-
ods
The proposed feature approximation methods are implemented in MATLAB and the
experimental results are run on a 2.5 GHz with 64 GB of RAM PC using 64-bit Win-
dows Server 2008 operating system. From a given biohash of length 1024-bits and the
corresponding secret key, we estimate the PCA feature vectors with four proposed meth-
ods, for PCA dimensions of 200 and 1024, respectively (Table 4.8). It is intuitive that
for all methods it is faster to estimate a 200-dimensional feature vector. Among the
four proposed methods, L2-norm minimization is the first to estimate a 200-dimensional
feature vector from a biohash of length 1024-bits. On the other hand, when the feature
vector to be estimated is 1024-dimensional, the BIHT method performs faster than other
methods.
Table 4.8: Computation time required to estimate a feature vector from a given
biohash (in seconds)
Method 1024→ 200 1024→ 1024
LP 12.681736 144.288818
BIHT 0.192342 0.294719
L2 0.108523 1.681796
L1 11.451703 26.453929
Method in [11] for t = 1 28.244039 185.517469
Method in [11] for t = 20 572.584385 4700.410120
4.3.4 Results for the Rainbow Attack
The rainbow attack is different from feature approximation methods and its success
mainly depends on the availability of a huge biometric database. In this study, we
simulate the rainbow attack where an adversary has the secret key and the biohash of
the user. We use the BioSecure-ds2 database and take the attacked user out of the set.
We calculate the biohashes of the remaining face images with the secret key of the user
and search for the one that is closest to the user’s biohash. In this manner, we describe
three different scenarios:
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Table 4.9: Equal Error Rates (%) for the rainbow attack
PCA Bit Length CM SAKC ALT
200
128 53.597 6.964 38.571
256 49.787 4.762 40.179
512 47.177 4.043 41.820
1024 46.054 3.342 43.469
1024
128 56.467 7.440 38.746
256 51.786 5.795 41.417
512 48.206 4.524 42.543
1024 46.794 3.296 43.439
Collusion Model (CM): Keys are known to the attacker and using an available
database, he finds the faces that provide the closest biohash given the secret key of the
valid user.
Security After Key Change (SAKC): Secret keys of users are changed by the
system administrator. The attacker does not know the new key but uses the face found
in the CM scenario.
Attack in the Long-term (ALT): The attacker obtains the new key. He uses the
face found in the CM scenario and the new key to create biohashes.
The equal error rates for the rainbow attack on biohashes for these three scenarios are
given in Table 4.9. Our visual inspection shows that, faces which create close biohashes
when combined with the same secret key are visually alike. This should also be regarded
as a threat to the privacy of the user, as well as a threat to the security of the system
(Figure 4.5).
4.3.5 Privacy Assessment of the Proposed Methods
A critical implication of the reversibility of biohashes is the relation between the recon-
structed feature vectors and the original biometric information (face) of the users. For
assessing to what extent the privacy of the user is at stake if his/her biohash is inverted
via our proposed methods, we compare face images reconstructed using the original
PCA vectors and the estimated features. Assuming that the attacker knows the details
of feature extraction (PCA matrix and mean vector), we reconstruct face images with
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Figure 4.5: Rainbow attack - faces that provide close biohashes.
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the approximated feature vectors using (4.12). In the following figures (Figures 4.6 and
4.7), we present the original face image of the user, the reconstructed face image from
original PCA coefficients, and the four reconstructed face images from obtained PCA
coefficients through L2, L1, LP and BIHT methods, respectively.
The first two set of images (Figures 4.6(a) and 4.6(b)) belong to two different users from
the database and the reconstruction is carried out on biohashes with length of 1024-
bits which are obtained from 200-dimensional PCA features. All four methods provide
face images that look similar to the subject’s original face image. Figures 4.7(a) and
4.7(b) illustrate the results for the same two users. The length of the biohashes used
is 1024-bits, however, the only difference is the number of PCA coefficients used, which
is 1024 instead of 200. It is immediately clear that estimating 1024-dimensional PCA
features is harder than estimating 200-dimensional PCA features and the reconstructed
face images show the difficulty in obtaining faces that are visually similar to the original
face image. Among the four proposed methods, only the LP solution stands out for
obtaining face images that look alike the original face of the subject. Figure 4.8 illustrates
the reconstruction of face images using the LP method for various PCA feature vector
dimensions and biohash bit lengths. It is clear that the reconstruction is visually more
successful when the length of the PCA feature to be estimated is smaller and the biohash
length is larger.
In addition to visually threatening the privacy of the system users, estimating feature
vectors from biohashes might threaten their privacy in other biometric recognitions
systems which use the same biometric characteristic (i.e., face information). To check
whether reconstructed feature vectors are close to the original PCA feature vectors or
not, we include face verification results of PCA vectors, (i.e., reconstructed feature vector
is compared to corresponding original feature vector). The Euclidean distance is used
to match two PCA vectors and each PCA vector is normalized in order to have zero
mean and unit variance prior to comparison. The normalization step is required since
the scale of the original PCA coefficients and the reconstructed ones might be different.
We do not include all verification results for brevity, but the EERs for PCA-based face
verification when 200-dimensional feature vectors are estimated from 1024-bits biohashes
are given in Table 4.10 and the corresponding DET curves are shown in Figure 4.9.
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(a) Sample user 1
(b) Sample user 2
Figure 4.6: Reconstructed face images from biohashes of length 1024-bits - PCA
dimension 200
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(a) Sample user 1
(b) Sample user 2
Figure 4.7: Reconstructed face images from biohashes of length 1024-bits - PCA
dimension 1024
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Figure 4.8: Reconstructed face images using the LP method for different biohash bit
lengths (128, 256, 512 and 1024)
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Figure 4.9: DET curves for direct feature level comparisons - 200-dimensional PCA
feature vectors & biohash length = 1024-bits
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Table 4.10: Equal Error Rates (%) for direct feature level comparisons - 200-
dimensional PCA feature vectors & biohash length = 1024-bits
LP 91.161
BIHT 91.773
L2 88.338
L1 78.720
4.4 Discussion
Biometric template protection is a critical problem that needs to be addressed to en-
hance the public acceptance of biometric technologies and it is essential to develop a
set of measures which can evaluate the strength of template protection techniques. Al-
though biometric cryptosystems can be analyzed using information theoretical metrics
such as entropy and mutual information, the suitability of theoretical analysis of the
transformation-based methods is based on the hardness of the invertibility of the trans-
formation.
When a user’s biohash is obtained by an adversary, it can seriously undermine the
security of the biometric system and privacy of users. If the secret key of a user is known
to the adversary, the biometric feature of the user can be reconstructed from the user’s
biohash which might harm the subject’s privacy and lead to illegitimate authentication
to a system. Biometric hashing is claimed to be irreversible due to the random projection
and quantization steps, however our study shows that an attacker is able to invert the
transformed template to obtain a close approximation to the original biometric template.
This thesis proposes four novel ways to approximate the original biometric feature from
the transformed template in a biometric hashing scheme and reveals security and privacy
problems concerning the associated biometric system. We define three different attack
scenarios under which we analyze the protection capability of biohashing. From the
security point of view, these attacks enable an adversary to recover a biometric template
under realistic assumptions and perform intrusion attacks to the biometric system. This
study is the first to analyze the inversion of biohashes in one-bit compressive sensing
framework. Experimental results show the superiority of this approach over minimum
norm solutions. Biohashes that are created from feature vectors obtained by using
LP and BIHT solutions to the one-bit compressive problem are equal to the original
biohashes stored during enrollment and this is a serious threat to the security of the
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system. In addition, this study introduces rainbow attack in order to find a biometric
template from a biometric database and use it to obtain a biohash that is same with or
close to the original biohash of a subject.
Biometric hashing scheme is a generic template protection scheme that can be applied
to various types of biometric features. In this paper, we focus on an orthogonal lin-
ear transform of face images, namely PCA (i.e., Eigenfaces). Several other studies on
biohashing also use PCA ([9, 11]) or LDA ([14]) (i.e., Fisherface) which is another or-
thogonal linear transform that is invertible. Using the knowledge of the linear transform
and its inversion, we analyze the privacy issues by reconstructing face images.
If the adversary knows system details (i.e., the PCA matrix, user’s secret key, and other
parameters), the obtained feature vectors can be used to reconstruct face images of the
subject which is a direct threat to the privacy of system users. The quality of the re-
constructed images depends on the number of bits and length of the original feature
vector and the images illustrated in the last section visually confirm the success of the
methods in reverting the biohash vectors. In this work, we study feature reconstruc-
tion and image reconstruction is carried out separately. Directly approximating images
from biohash vectors may also be possible by integrating the PCA transformation with
random projection matrix and solving the optimization problem by enforcing sparsity
in the DCT or block-DCT domain. However, our initial experiments in this direction
indicate that image level approximation approach lowers the performance both in secu-
rity perspective (evaluated through EERs) and privacy perspective (evaluated through
visual inspection of the reconstructed face images) due to the fact that the number of
dimensions to be approximated is higher for images.
In the future, the effects of various improvements proposed for biometric hashing scheme
might be investigated for security and privacy analysis by carrying out similar attacks
on the improved versions of biometric hashing. In addition, weaknesses of the biometric
hashing scheme should be explored and possible modifications should be introduced for
better security and privacy protection capability in the light of the inversion attacks
proposed in this study.
Chapter 5
Template Protection for
Fingerprint Spectral Minutiae
Template protection options for fingerprint minutiae are discussed in section 2.4. It can
be concluded that fuzzy vault has its own security and privacy drawbacks in addition
to degradation in matching accuracy due to alignment issues and nonlinear distortion.
For other alternative template protection schemes, a fixed-length feature vector or a
binarized string is required. Spectral minutiae representation is one of the very few
approaches that provides such a fixed-length representation for minutiae points.
In this chapter, we introduce spectral minutiae representation in detail and provide the
first implementation of biometric hashing for spectral minutiae [40]. Our work in [40]
is an initial attempt for protecting fingerprint minutiae templates. In the next chapter,
we improve on the introduction to minutiae protection that we discuss here.
5.1 Biometric Hashing with Fingerprint Spectral Minutiae
Spectral minutiae representation [16] provides a fixed-length feature vector from minu-
tiae location and direction information (i.e., (x, y, θ) in ISO 19794-2 standard format [60]).
This fixed-length template for a fingerprint sample can then be combined with existing
biometric template protection methods. In this work, biometric hashing scheme [7] is
used for securing fingerprints and generating protected bit strings based on minutiae
information only.
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Biometric hashing transforms the biometric information of a user by using pseudo-
random data which is generated from a user specified key or token. The combination
of pseudo-random number and biometric data protects the biometric template against
biometric fabrication when the corresponding token or knowledge of the randomization
is not available to an adversary. Token-based randomization also enables revocation of
one’s biometric template via token replacement. This makes it possible to renew the
biometric record of the subject in cases where it is compromised. Furthermore, different
biohashes from the same fingerprint can be generated by using different tokens which
allows a subject to be enrolled to two or more applications.
5.1.1 Spectral Minutiae Representation
The spectral minutiae representation of a minutiae set is a fixed-length feature vector
that is invariant to translation, rotation and scaling [16]. These characteristics enable
the combination of fingerprint recognition systems with template protection schemes and
allow for fast minutiae-based matching. The spectral minutiae representation requires
only minutiae information, therefore it is compatible with most of the existing fingerprint
databases (in which only minutiae are saved and no additional information related to
the finger, e.g., ridge count, singular points, and pores are kept) and minutiae-based
fingerprint verification systems.
Complex spectral minutiae (SMC) is one of the three possible spectral minutiae repre-
sentations proposed by Xu et al. [17] in order to obtain a fixed-length feature vector
using minutiae location and orientation only. The other two alternatives are location
based spectral minutiae (SML) and orientation based spectral minutiae (SMO) which
are given in detail in [16].
In SMC, each minutiae is represented by a Dirac pulse and in order to reduce the sensi-
tivity of minutiae locations to small variations in the spatial domain, a Gaussian low-pass
filter is used to attenuate higher frequencies. This low-pass filtering in the frequency
domain corresponds to a convolution in the spatial domain where every minutia is now
represented by an isotropic two-dimensional Gaussian function with standard deviation
σC . Minutiae locations on a fingerprint image and the corresponding Gaussian functions
are illustrated in Figure 5.1. Minutiae orientation is incorporated into this representa-
tion by assigning each Gaussian a complex amplitude ejθi , where θi is the orientation of
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Figure 5.1: Minutiae locations and set of minutiae represented by Gaussian functions
the corresponding minutia. For a set of Z minutiae with locations (xi, yi)|Zi=1, the com-
plex spectral representation, MC(wx, wy;σ
2
C), is obtained by evaluating the magnitude
of the Fourier spectrum (5.1) on a polar-logarithmic grid as:
MC(wx, wy;σ
2
C) =
∣∣∣∣∣exp
(
−w
2
x + w
2
y
2σ−2C
)
Z∑
i=1
exp(−j(wxxi + wyyi) + jθi)
∣∣∣∣∣ , (5.1)
where wx and wy are the spatial frequencies in the x and y directions.
The Fourier spectral magnitude is mapped onto a polar-logarithmic coordinate system
as λ =
√
w2x + w
2
y and β = arctan (wy/wx), where λ corresponds to the radial direction
and β corresponds to the angular direction. In the radial direction M = 128 samples
are used between λl = 0.05 and λh = 0.63. In the angular direction N = 256 samples
are used between β = 0 and β = 2pi. The resulting complex spectral representation of a
minutiae set is a 128× 256 matrix (Figure 5.2).
5.1.2 Protecting SMC Template with Biometric Hashing
Biometric hashing, initially applied to FingerCode [32] fingerprint templates by Jin et
al. [7], is a two factor authentication approach that combines a fingerprint with a user
specified key/token and generates a unique compact code per person (Figure 5.3). A
bit string from biometric data is created by taking the inner product of a fixed-length
fingerprint feature vector and the pseudo-random number sequence that is generated
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Figure 5.2: Complex spectral minutiae representation of a fingerprint
Figure 5.3: Two factor authentication - secret key and fingerprint
using the key as the seed. Each bit is decided based on the sign of the result by
comparing to a pre-defined threshold.
In our study, we convert the M × N spectral fingerprint feature (MC) to a bit string,
b ∈ {0, 1}p, by applying the biohashing scheme to complex spectral minutiae features.
Each column of MC is a M -dimensional column vector. Randomly projecting each
column of MC to k dimensions and then thresholding the resulting vector, we obtain
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Figure 5.4: BioHashing procedure - from spectral representation to bit string
a k-length bit string per column. The mean value of the k-dimensional feature vector
is used as the quantization threshold. We apply the same procedure to each column of
MC and concatenate the bit strings to create a p-length bit string, where p = k ×N .
In our implementation, the spectral fingerprint representation that we create from a
minutiae set (MC), is a 128 × 256 matrix. Each column fn of this matrix is a 128-
dimensional column vector and it is reduced to k dimensions by multiplying it (R · fn)
with the random projection matrix, R (which is a k × 128 matrix). Thresholding the
resulting k-dimensional feature vector by using its mean value as the threshold, we obtain
a k-length bit string. The outputs of each column of MC are then concatenated in order
to create a bit string of length k × 256. We evaluate different values of k and use k = 4
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resulting in a 1024-bit final feature vector to obtain a high verification accuracy while
keeping the feature vector small (Figure 5.4).
5.1.3 Experiments and Results
5.1.3.1 Experimental Settings
We evaluate our algorithm on publicly available FVC2002 fingerprint databases, namely
DB1A, DB2A, and DB3A [61]. DB1 and DB2 consist of fingerprint images captured
with optical sensors whereas images in DB3 are captured with a capacitive fingerprint
sensor. We select these three databases in order to evaluate the performance of our
method for different image capturing technologies and leave the synthetic fingerprint
database DB4 out in the experiments. For performance evaluations, we adopt the equal
error rate (EER), which is the error rate when the frequency of false accepts (FAR) and
the frequency of false rejections (FRR) are equal to each other.
The minutiae sets are obtained by a commercial automatic minutiae extractor (Verifinger
4.4 SDK). We use our algorithm in a high security scenario as suggested in the original
spectral minutiae work [16]. In FVC2002 databases, some of the samples are obtained by
requesting users to provide fingerprints with exaggerated displacement and rotation. In
a high security scenario, users are aware that cooperation is crucial for security reasons.
Therefore, only four out of eight samples are chosen for each subject (1-2-6-7 for DB1,
1-2-7-8 for DB2, and 1-2-6-7 for DB3). Following the verification setting described in
FVC competitions, we use all possible combinations to match genuine pairs and the
first sample of each subject is chosen for imposter matches. Without making symmetric
comparisons, this results in a total of 600 (4 × 3 × 100/2) genuine matches and 4950
(99× 100/2) imposter matches for 100 subjects.
5.1.3.2 Results for the Naive Model
We evaluate the spectral minutiae representation and biohash of spectral minutiae rep-
resentation on three databases. For comparison, we also include the results from two
other matching methods: i) matching two fingerprints based on the correlation of their
complex spectral minutiae (called SMC-Correlation) and ii) matching two fingerprints
using a minutiae-based commercial matcher which is also used for minutiae extraction.
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Figure 5.5: Genuine and imposter distance distribution for the FVC2002DB1A
database
The equal error rates (EER) for all methods on three databases are given in Table 5.1.
As can be seen in this table, we obtain a 0% EER for all databases when biohashing is
applied on the spectral minutiae features.
Table 5.1: EER on FVC2002 databases
SMC-Correlation Minutiae Matching SMC-BioHash
FVC2002 DB1 6.50% 0.50% 0.00%
FVC2002 DB2 6.47% 0.83% 0.00%
FVC2002 DB3 11.68% 2.50% 0.00%
Two factor biometric hashing (fingerprint + user specified tokens) provides a clean
separation of genuine and imposter populations along with a zero EER level. As an
example, genuine and imposter distance distribution for the FVC2002 DB1 database
is illustrated in Figure 5.5. It is observed that the highest genuine distance is smaller
than the lowest imposter distance, therefore a perfect separation between genuine and
imposter distances is obtained.
5.1.3.3 Results for Stolen Key Scenario
We also evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme on a stolen key scenario,
where an unauthorized imposter acquires the secret key/token of a genuine user but
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Figure 5.6: Genuine and imposter distance distribution for the FVC2002DB1A
database for the stolen key scenario
does not have the claimed person’s fingerprint information. In this case, the imposter
sends his/her fingerprint template and the secret key/token of the genuine user in order
to be authenticated as the genuine user. This is a serious threat to the system as the
pseudo-random vectors generated using the secret key has a considerable influence on
the generated bit string, therefore on the matching score.
Assuming that the key is unknown at all times (never stolen) makes the use of bio-
metric unnecessary for real authentication scenarios. In order to analyze the effect of
the key/token and generated random vectors on the resulting bit strings, we conduct
experiments in a stolen key scenario where an imposter attempt has the same secret key
with the user that he/she is intended to authenticate as. The equal error rates for this
scenario are given in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: EER on FVC2002 databases - stolen key scenario
SMC-Correlation SMC-BioHash (Stolen Key)
FVC2002 DB1 6.50% 14.77%
FVC2002 DB2 6.47% 13.10%
FVC2002 DB3 11.68% 26.46%
While these error rates are considerably high in this case, they are in the same range
as other results obtained with fingerprint biohash implementations. For instance, the
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straightforward biohash implementation that uses the FingerCode [32] reported in [45]
achieves a 15%, 15%, and 27% EER on FVC2002 DB1-DB3 databases respectively for
the stolen key scenario (the BASE row in Table 5 of [45]). Our error rates for this case
are slightly better in the same scenario. The same authors reported improved results
(7%, 6.8%, and 22% on FVC2002 DB1-DB3 respectively) with a classifier combination
approach that aims to reduce the stability issues of biohash, presumably with a system
significantly slower and larger than ours.
5.1.3.4 Analysis
Two factor biometric hashing scheme used in this study improves the verification ac-
curacy of biometrics alone and provides a clear separation of the genuine and imposter
distances achieving a zero EER level. With this method, a unique compact code per
person is obtained which is easy to match via bit-wise XOR operation (Hamming dis-
tance).
Our main contribution is providing the first implementation of the biohashing scheme
with spectral minutiae representation. The proposed scheme is computationally fast
as it only uses column-wise random projection of the spectral minutiae matrix while
achieving a 0% EER in the 1-to-1 verification scenario.
The original spectral minutiae features are 8096-dimensional (128 × 256). In order to
create a 1024-bits string, one needs to generate a random projection matrix of size
1024 × 8096. Instead, we propose to use a single 4 × 128 random projection matrix to
multiply with each column of SMC (128-dimensional column vectors). This results in
a computationally low random projection operation as well as an adaptive thresholding
for each column of SMC, instead of generating a larger projection matrix (which takes
more time to generate for higher number of vectors - 1024 instead of 4) and using a
single threshold for quantization.
5.2 Discussion
Biometrics is a key factor for human identification or identity management since it bases
recognition task on intrinsic human characteristics and the person to be authenticated
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should be physically present. However, biometrics suffer from high false rejection of
valid users when a high security scenario is desired with a low false acceptance rate.
In this study, we propose a biometric hashing approach for fingerprint identification
based on minutiae information. Using the spectral minutiae representation of a finger-
print minutiae set, we create a fixed-length bit string by randomly projecting spectral
minutiae feature vectors. With this approach, one can obtain perfect separation be-
tween the genuine and imposter population and the system provides a 0% equal error
rate, which is desired for all identity verification systems. In addition, in case the secret
key of a valid user is stolen, the system allows acceptable error rates for imposter authen-
tication attempts with a valid secret key. Also, biometric revocation becomes feasible
through secret key (token) replacement, which addresses the cancellability issue.
Possible future work in this direction includes different quantization methods following
the random projection of spectral minutiae feature vectors in order to provide non-
invertibility of the protected template. The processing time for comparing two bit strings
is very low as Hamming distance metric is used for bit string comparison. However,
extracting the feature vector from spectral minutiae representation takes considerable
time. This is another issue which should be addressed. It is also important to investigate
the stolen key scenario and decrease the error rates when the secret key of a user is stolen
by creating intelligent projections.
This study is an initial attempt for protecting fingerprint minutiae templates. However,
it should be noted that a large overlapping area between fingerprints is required for
spectral minutiae representation to perform well. Missing or spurious minutia leads to
decreased verification performance. In the remaining chapters of this thesis, we seek for
a better fixed-length representation for minutiae.
Chapter 6
GMM-SVM Fingerprint
Verification
In this chapter, our ultimate goal is to describe an underlying framework that enables the
generation of a fixed-length feature vector representation for fingerprint minutiae. The
framework draws upon the work of Campbell et al. on support vector machines using
GMM supervectors for speaker verification [18]. Each minutia and its neighbors within a
specified radius are represented as a 2D image by placing two-dimensional Gaussians at
the locations of neighbor minutiae. DCT coefficients of this patch image are rearranged
based on zig-zag scanning and the first D DCT coefficients of this patch image are used
to represent each minutia as a D-dimensional feature vector. A single user-independent
GMM universal background model (UBM) is trained from a collection of fingerprints to
represent the distribution of DCT features. A fingerprint is then represented with its
probabilistic alignment into the UBM mixture components and a GMM supervector is
created from the stacked first order statistics of the mixture components.
For a given enrollment fingerprint sample, a two-class linear SVM is trained in order
to create a model template that discriminates positive samples from negative samples.
The matching between a query fingerprint and the model template is performed by
computing a single inner product between the target fingerprint SVM model and the
query fingerprint GMM supervector. Next, the GMM-SVM features are binarized using
asymmetric locality sensitive hashing. The overall GMM-SVM fingerprint verification
system is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The performance of our framework is evaluated in a
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Figure 6.1: Overall framework of the GMM-SVM fingerprint verification system
one-to-one fingerprint verification setup and the results on the FVC2002DB1A and the
FVC2002DB2A databases demonstrate that our approach performs better than existing
fixed-length methods.
6.1 DCT-based Minutiae Patch Representation
6.1.1 Minutia Patch
A minutia patch is a local representation that encodes a minutia and its geometric
relations with other minutiae that are closely located. Each minutia patch consists of a
central minutia mc and its neighboring minutiae within a radius R (Figure 6.2(a)). In
order to directly compare two minutia patches, without any registration for the relative
alignment of fingerprints, a relatively invariant representation using mc as a reference
is required. The central minutia mc can be used to define a new coordinate system
where its position would be the center of the system and its orientation would give the
direction of the x-axis. In this new coordinate system, the coordinates and orientations
of the neighbor points would be translated and rotated accordingly. This representation
scheme is inspired from minutiae vicinities described in [38].
In this representation, a global set of minutiae is converted into a collection of several
local minutiae sets and a patch is constructed for each minutia of a fingerprint. This
also enables two fingerprints to be matched by locally comparing patches pairwise and
calculating their similarity score using the local scores of the best pairs. Although global
coherency in the minutiae set is not utilized, the local approach has the advantage of
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(a) A minutia and its
neighbors in R
(b) Gaussian repre-
sentation for neighbor
minutiae
(c) Neighbor minutiae
at the new coordinate
system
(d) Reconstructed
minutiae patch image
from DCT coefficients
Figure 6.2: DCT representation of a minutia patch image
limiting the crucial elastic distortion problem in fingerprint matching. In the local area
of a patch, distortion due to the elasticity of the skin is negligible. The radius used
in the local approach is of great importance. The neighborhood of the central minutia
should contain several minutiae in order to be sufficiently discriminative but at the same
time it should be small enough to be considered as a local area.
6.1.2 Gaussian minutia patch image
Within a specific radius R, the number of neighbor points of a central minutia varies
and this leads to a minutia representation of unknown length. In order to obtain a fixed
length representation, one can use a rectangular grid of size (2R + 1)× (2R + 1) where
the central minutiae is at the center. Each neighbor minutia is then inserted into this
grid with respect to its relative location to mc on the fingerprint.
Representing a minutia with a single point in the spatial domain increases the sensitivity
of minutiae positions to small variations and does not maintain direction information.
Instead, each neighbor minutia is represented by a two-dimensional multivariate Gaus-
sian. We first consider a template anisotropic Gaussian:
f(x, µ,Σ) =
1
2piσ1σ2
e−
1
2
(x−µ)TΣ−1(x−µ), (6.1)
where Σ = diag(σ1, σ2) is the covariance matrix with σ1 > σ2. A Gaussian is centered
at each neighbor minutia location and its covariance matrix is selected such that the
major axis coincides with the minutia orientation as illustrated in Figure 6.2(b). For
a neighbor minutia with relative position (xi, yi) and relative angle θi as compared
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(a) Two neighbor minutiae (b) Minutia patch for minutia 1 (c) Minutia patch for minutia 2
Figure 6.3: Selected minutiae patches of two neighbor minutia from the same finger-
print image (before rotation)
with the central minutia in the patch, the template Gaussian is translated to (xi, yi)
and rotated with θi. This makes the mean of Gaussian µi = [xi, yi]
T and covariance
matrix Σi = R(θi)ΣR(θi)
T , where R(θi) is a rotation matrix
1. The patch image is then
generated as a sum over these shifted Gaussians:
I(x) =
Np∑
i=1
f(x, µi,Σi) (6.2)
where Np is the number of neighbor minutiae. Sample minutia patch images selected
from a fingerprint are illustrated in Figures 6.3(b) and 6.3(c). Please note that, the
central minutia is not directly included in this representation, but it defines the new
coordinate system and the neighbors of the patch.
6.1.3 DCT representation for minutia patches
Although minutia patch images capture the required information for fingerprint match-
ing, (2R+1)2-dimensional representation for each minutia brings heavy computation and
storage requirements. Discrete cosine transform (DCT) is often used in image process-
ing, especially for lossy compression (e.g., JPEG), due to its strong energy compaction
property. It expresses a finite sequence of data points in terms of a sum of cosine func-
tions oscillating at different frequencies. Since most of the signal information tend to
be concentrated in a few low-frequency components of the DCT, discarding small high-
frequency components results in compact representation of the signal. By keeping only
1Please note that, Gaussians are placed prior to the rotation with respect to the orientation of the
central minutia θc.
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the first D 2D-DCT coefficients after performing zig-zag scanning, each minutia patch
image is represented as a D-dimensional feature vector. This enables two patches to be
easily compared via Euclidean distance between their D-dimensional feature vectors.
Minutiae Pair Matching via DCT Patches We conduct an evaluation to assess
the discriminative power of our DCT minutia patch representation. To compare two fin-
gerprints, fp1 and fp2, a pairing matrix that contains similarity scores between patches
of fp1 and patches of fp2 is constructed. The scores are computed using a decreasing
function that converts the Euclidean distances between DCT coefficients to a score (i.e.,
g(x) = 1/(1 + ex/τ )).
DCT minutia patches
(#minutiae = T1)
fp1 
DCT minutia patches
(#minutiae = T2)
fp2
T2
T1
T2 -1
T1 -1
T2 -2
T1 -2
T2 - k
T1 - k
1st turn
2nd turn
kth turn
Figure 6.4: Minutiae pairing matrix and selection of highest score at each turn
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A closest neighbor search algorithm is applied to the pairing matrix in order to select
the best association of minutiae. At each turn, a minutiae pair from fp1 and fp2 with
the highest matching score is identified and removed from the matrix (Figure 6.4). The
final score between two fingerprints is computed by accumulating the matching scores
of identified pairs during the search.
In the evaluation, the FVC2002DB1A database [61] which has 8 impressions of 100
different fingerprints captured with an optical sensor is used. Following the performance
evaluation protocol of FVC2002 [62], 2800 genuine and 4950 imposter comparisons are
performed. An Equal Error Rate (EER) of 4.46% is achieved for D = 50. Although,
the achieved EER is worse than the state of the art [61, 62], it arguably confirms the
discriminative capability of minutia patches.
6.2 GMM Supervector Training
Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) have been dominantly used for modeling in text-
independent speaker verification. The distribution of features extracted from speech
segments (i.e., frames of an utterance) is modeled by performing background model
adaptation of GMMs. First, a universal background model (UBM) is trained from set
of frames and then the speaker model for the ith speaker is derived by adapting the
universal background model to match the observations of the speaker. Recently, the use
of GMM for modeling feature distribution has also become an effective approach for face
verification [63].
Similar to the frames of a speech utterance or the blocks of a face image, minutiae
points of a fingerprint are separate observations of the same underlying signal. DCT
patch representation of minutiae is used to train a universal background minutiae model.
The UBM is a large GMM trained to represent the distribution of features. From a huge
database of fingerprints, a large number of minutiae patches are extracted as training
data and they are pooled to train the UBM via EM (expectation maximization [64])
algorithm2:
2For further details, please refer to [65].
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g(x) =
N∑
i=1
wipi(x) (6.3)
where wi are the mixture weights and pi(x) is the unimodal Gaussian density with mean
mi and covariance Σi (diagonal covariance is assumed as this requires fewer observations
to train from).
Given a fingerprint with T minutiae, xt, t = 1, ..., T are the DCT minutia patches for
each minutia. The estimates of first order statistics for the fingerprint data are computed
for mixture i in the UBM as:
Ei(x) =
T∑
t=1
Pr(i|xt)(xt − µi) (6.4)
Pr(i|xt) = wipi(xt)∑M
j=1wjpj(xt)
(6.5)
Using only the first order statistics (Ei(x)), a GMM supervector is formed by con-
catenating the first order statistics of each mixture. The GMM supervector maps a
fingerprint to a high-dimensional vector of size DN× 1, where D is the number of DCT
coefficients and N is the number of Gaussians in the mixture (Figure 6.5). Please note
GMM UBM 
means 
DCT minutia patches 
of FP1 
μ1 
μ2 
μN 
GMM Supervector 
of FP1 
Figure 6.5: GMM supervector generation from a single fingerprint
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that, we do not perform MAP adaptation as done in [18, 63, 65, 66] for adapting a
speaker model. Our experiments shows that using first order statistics without MAP
adaptation performed better, so we employ first order statistics only.
6.3 Linear SVM Training for Template Generation
An SVM is a two-class linear classifier constructed from sums of a kernel function K
f(x) =
L∑
i=1
αitiK(x,xi) + d (6.6)
where ti are the ideal outputs (either 1 or -1), d is a learned constant,
∑L
i=1 αiti = 0,
and αi > 0. The vectors xi are support vectors and obtained from the training set by an
optimization process. The kernel K is constrained to have certain properties so that K
can be expressed as an inner product, K(x,xi) = Φ(xi) ·Φ(x), where Φ(·) is a mapping
to a higher dimension.
SVM provides a suitable solution to fingerprint verification problem, since it is funda-
mentally a two-class problem. We aim to decide whether the fingerprint comes from the
user or the fingerprint belongs to someone else. As the number of features is large in
our problem (DN), we do not need to map data to a higher dimensional space and use
linear kernel (i.e., K(x,xi) = x
T
i x. In practice, the linear kernel tends to perform very
well when the number of features is large. In addition, GMM supervector has already
been employed as a linear kernel with a simple diagonal scaling [18, 67]. The SVM in
(6.6) can be expressed as:
f(x) =
L∑
i=1
αitix
T
i x + d
=
(
L∑
i=1
αitixi
)T
x + d = wTx + d
(6.7)
which reduces two-class classification to an inner product between the classifier model
w and GMM supervector x. The model w is solved by minimizing:
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min
w,d
(
1
2
‖w‖2 + C
∑
i
H1
(
ti(w
Txi + d)
))
(6.8)
where H1(z) = max(0, 1 − z) is the ”Hinge Loss” and C is a regularization parameter
that controls a tradeoff between a low error on the training data and the ability to
generalize well.
We use SVM to create a model w (which we also refer to as a reference template) for
an enrollment fingerprint sample fenroll. This is achieved by training an SVM using the
GMM supervector of fenroll as a positive sample (labeled as +1) and GMM supervectors
of fingerprints from example imposters as negative samples (labeled as -1). Given a query
fingerprint sample fquery, its matching score for the subject i is the inner product between
wi and xquery, where wi is the SVM classifier model for the subject i and xquery is the
GMM supervector of fquery. The verification decision is based upon whether the score
wTi xquery is above or below a threshold. This approach provides one-to-one fingerprint
matching as only one single training sample for each class is used to train the template
model. It corresponds to comparing a gallery fingerprint to a query fingerprint as done
in all other fingerprint verification systems.
6.3.1 Initial Experiments and Results
We perform one-to-one fingerprint verification experiments on the FVC2002DB1A fin-
gerprint database [61]. For minutiae extraction, a commercial fingerprint minutiae ex-
tractor (which participated in FVC-onGoing [68], Ongoing MINEX [69] and FpVTE
2012 [70]) is used to obtain minutiae information in ISO 19794-2 format (x, y, θ) [60].
In order to create patches for each minutia, all neighbor minutiae within a radius R = 60
pixels at 500 dpi resolution are used. This results in minutia patch images of size
121× 121 pixels. For DCT representation of patches, the first 50 DCT coefficients after
zig-zag scanning are kept (i.e. D = 50), which means that a minutia is represented along
with its local information via a feature vector of length 50.
We use 158083 fingerprints from publicly available FVC databases and an in-house finger-
print database collected via an optical reader. The details of these databases (number
332 minutiae in FVC2006DB1 have zero neighbors within R, therefore they are not used in GMM
training.
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DB Name #Fingers
#Fingers ×
#Samples/Finger
FVC2002DB2 800 100 × 8
FVC2002DB3 800 100 × 8
FVC2002DB4 800 100 × 8
FVC2004DB1 800 100 × 8
FVC2004DB2 800 100 × 8
FVC2004DB3 800 100 × 8
FVC2004DB4 800 100 × 8
FVC2006DB1 1648 140 × 12
FVC2006DB2 1680 140 × 12
FVC2006DB3 1680 140 × 12
FVC2006DB4 1680 140 × 12
IN-HOUSE DB 3520 440 × 8
TOTAL 15808
Table 6.1: Number of fingerprints used in GMM training
of fingers and samples per finger) can be found in Table 6.1. Our target database,
FVC2002DB1A, is not included in GMM training to prevent any bias that might fa-
vor supervector representation in the advantage of the FVC2002DB1A database. The
GMMs are trained for different number of Gaussians (1024, 2048, and 4096) and their
results are reported separately. Once the universal models are trained, we extract first
order statistics of fingerprint samples from FVC2002DB1A and produce supervectors for
GMMs with different number of Gaussians, which results in supervectors of dimensions
51200 (1024× 50), 102400 (2048× 50), and 204800 (4096× 50).
For the enrollment of target fingerprints, we train an SVM for each fingerprint sample
using the target GMM supervector and the set of imposter GMM supervectors labeled
as -1, using the first impression of each subject as imposters. The weight vector of
the SVM classifier model is the template for the enrolled fingerprint sample. During
verification, GMM supervector of the query fingerprint is compared to the template of
the claimed identity and their inner product is used to give an accept or reject decision.
The verification protocol is as follows:
i) Each impression is matched against the remaining impressions of the same finger.
The total number of genuine tests is 5600 (8× 7× 100).
ii) The first impression of each finger is matched against the first impression of the
remaining fingers. The total number of imposter tests is 9900 (99× 100).
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# Gaussians EER
1024 2.191%
2048 1.911%
4096 1.633%
Table 6.2: Equal error rates for GMMs with different number of Gaussians
Since wTfp1xfp2 is different from w
T
fp2
xfp1 , both scores are calculated and included in
the experiments separately as either genuine or imposter matching scores.
Equal error rates (EERs) for GMMs with different number of Gaussians are shown in
Table 6.2. The optimal C values for training SVMs corresponding to different number of
Gaussians are found by grid search and best C values were 10, 0.001, and 1 for 1024, 2048,
and 4096 Gaussians, respectively. As the number of Gaussians in the GMMs increases,
our method performs better in representing feature distribution which eventually leads
to lower error rates.
In order to provide comparison with our system, we also perform direct minutiae match-
ing4 with the commercial algorithm which we also use for minutiae extraction. It obtains
0.50% EER on FVC2002DB1A and performs better than our method. This difference
stems from the facts that we can neither perform minutiae pair search, which is a cru-
cial step for minutiae matching, nor include singular point information. However, the
main purpose of this study is to present a fixed-length fingerprint representation and
this performance drop is expected.
6.3.2 Discussion
The GMM-SVM based feature representation is a novel method to create a fixed-length
feature vector for fingerprint minutiae. Although minutiae-based matching is the most
widely used technique in fingerprint verification/identification, the increasing security
and privacy concerns make minutiae template protection one of the most crucial tasks.
The main motivation of this study is to obtain a fixed-length feature vector for finger-
prints so that minutiae based fingerprint verification can be combined with template
protection schemes. In addition, our method avoids the difficulties of minutiae registra-
tion by representing minutiae patches on a normalized coordinate system defined by the
4Additional fingerprint features that are not defined in ISO minutiae template are not used in any of
the experiments.
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orientation of the central minutia. Also, major problem of elastic distortion in fingerprint
matching is compensated with the local representation of the minutiae neighborhoods.
This study introduces a fixed-length feature representation for variable length minutiae
of a fingerprint. In order to combine our method with the cryptographic primitives
for template protection, such as [71, 72], one should extract bits that are stable for
genuine users and completely random for arbitrary users. Random projection-based
biometric hashing [7] cannot be directly applied to minutiae templates, however, another
possible direction for securing minutiae might be applying biohashing to our GMM-SVM
fingerprint feature vectors.
In the remaining of this chapter, we will work towards hashing of the feature vectors
created by our approach and include the binarization of the GMM-SVM feature vectors.
We also conjecture that enriching the database that is used in training GMMs and using
random resampling ([73]) for addressing data-imbalance problem in SVM will be possible
improvements to our GMM-SVM minutiae representation.
6.4 Asymmetric Locality Sensitive Hashing
In this section, we introduce an asymmetric hashing scheme for the inner product match-
ing of GMM-SVM feature vectors presented in Section 6.3. The matching score between
a reference SVM model template and a query GMM supervector is calculated via inner
product of these two vectors. The main goal of asymmetric locality sensitive hashing
is to convert reference SVM model templates and query GMM supervectors into binary
strings, so that they can be compared using Hamming difference. The asymmetry comes
from the differences in transformations that are applied on template model vectors and
query fingerprint feature vectors separately. We adopt the asymmetric locality sensitive
hashing method proposed in [19] for maximum inner product search using sign random
projections. First, we present the fundamentals of locality sensitive hashing. Then, we
continue with the asymmetric feature transformation.
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6.4.1 Locality Sensitive Hashing
Locality sensitive hashing (LSH) [74] is initially proposed to solve the problem of effi-
ciently finding nearest neighbors. It improves over the brute-force algorithm in which
the query point is compared to each data point. LSH is a family of functions with the
property that more similar items in the d-dimensional Euclidean space according to some
similarity measure have a higher collision probability hence a lower expected Hamming
distance (Figure 6.6).
x 
w 
x 
w 
LSH 
LSH 
. . . 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
. . . 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
. . . 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
. . . 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Low Hamming Distance 
High Hamming Distance 
h(x) 
h(w) 
h(x) 
h(w) 
Figure 6.6: Illustration of the LSH scheme
6.4.1.1 LSH for correlation
In our GMM-SVM framework,the inner product between a query vector x and a database
model w, wTx is the score used for making decisions. It is required to find a hashing
scheme such that the Hamming distance between the hashes of the vectors would ap-
proximate their inner product.
Sign random projection (SRP) is a popular LSH family in which the sign of the projection
is kept [76, 77]. The hash function using SRP is defined as:
ht(x) = sign(a
T
t x), (6.9)
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where at is randomly chosen from i.i.d. normal distribution with at(i) ∼ N(0, 1). Note
that, this is the same as biohashing. So, we are using biohashing for LSH here.
The correlation or cosine similarity between a query x and model w is defined as:
wTx
‖w‖‖x‖ . (6.10)
It has been shown that the correlation between vectors is monotonically related to the
collision probability of sign random projections [77] due to the following relation:
P (ht(x) = ht(w)) = 1− 1
pi
cos−1
(
wTx
(||w||||x||)
)
. (6.11)
So, the probability of one bit random hashes of two vectors to be equal is monotonically
related to the cosine similarity (or correlation) between two vectors. After a basic
transformation of the hash code outputs from {−1, 1} to {0, 1}, the Hamming distance
between two N -bit hashes in terms of XOR is:
Dh(h(w), h(x)) =
N∑
t=1
(ht(w)⊕ ht(x)) , (6.12)
where Dh denotes the Hamming distance operator and ⊕ is the bitwise XOR operator.
Due to this relation, Hamming distance can be seen as a sum of Bernoulli random vari-
ables and consequently has a binomial distribution with probability of success equal to
one minus the collision probability given in 6.11. Here, we make a simplifying assumption
of independent bits.
Hence for an N -bit SRP hash, the expected value of the Hamming distance between the
hashes is:
E(Dh(h(x), h(w))) =
N
pi
cos−1
(
wTx
(||w||||x||)
)
. (6.13)
The relation between vector correlations which takes values in the range [-1,1] and the
expected N -bit normalized Hamming distance between their SRP hashes is shown in
Figure 6.7. The confidence intervals shown in this figure is obtained by assuming that the
Hamming distance is distributed binomial. It is easy to see that if the number of bits N
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is large enough, correlation and N -bit Hamming distances will be monotonically related,
hence an ascending ranking of expected Hamming distances and a descending ranking of
correlations will be the same. This means that if we wanted to use correlations between
vectors for scoring verification attempts, we can safely use Hamming distances between
N -bit SRP hashes instead, without significantly affecting verification performance.
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Figure 6.7: Relation between the correlation and the expected normalized Hamming
distance together with 95% confidence intervals for different hash lengths
However, we are interested in calculating inner products and not correlations between
vectors due to our linear SVM formulation. In order to be able to approximate inner
products with Hamming distances, we need to use asymmetric hashing.
6.4.2 Asymmetric Feature Transformation
In our GMM-SVM framework, matching score between a query fingerprint and a refer-
ence template is calculated based on the inner product of the corresponding vectors. Due
to variations in the norms of these vectors, an inner product cannot be substituted with
a correlation directly. Asymmetric feature transformation, where the transformations
Fx and Fw are different for input query and reference data, converts an inner product
to a correlation so that outputs of these two operations are approximately equal [19].
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It should be noted that the preprocessing transformation Fx is applied on the query x
and the preprocessing transformation Fw is applied on the reference model w.
For the purpose of converting correlations to inner products, [19] defines two vector
transformations F ′w : RD 7→ RD+2m and F ′x : RD 7→ RD+2m as:
F ′w(w) = [w; 1/2− ‖w‖22; 1/2− ‖w‖42; ...; 1/2− ‖w‖2m2 ; 0; 0; ...; 0], (6.14)
F ′x(x) = [x; 0; 0; ...; 0; 1/2− ‖x‖22; 1/2− ‖x‖42; ...; 1/2− ‖x‖2m2 ]. (6.15)
The transformation F ′w(w) first appends m components of the form 1/2 − ‖w‖2
i
2 and
then m zeros. Its asymmetric counterpart F ′x(x) first appends m zeros and then m
components of the form 1/2− ‖x‖2i2 .
Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that ‖wi‖2 ≤ U < 1,∀wi enrolled in the
database and ‖xi‖2 ≤ U < 1,∀xi. If that is not the case, it is possible to scale all data
points. Let M be the upper bound on all norms, i.e. M = max(max ‖w‖2,max ‖x‖2)
and the transformation T : RD 7→ RD as:
T (x) = x
U
M
. (6.16)
We apply this transformation first to limit the norms of the vectors, then we apply
the asymmetric transforms provided in 6.14 and 6.15. Finally, we obtain combined
transformations Fw and Fx which can be defined as Fw = F
′
w ◦ T and Fx = F ′x ◦ T ,
respectively. The inner product between a query x and reference data w after the
transformations Fw and Fx become:
Fw(w)
TFx(x) = w
Tx
(
U2
M2
)
. (6.17)
Fw(w) and Fx(x) are now D + 2m dimensional and their norms are given by:
‖Fw(w)‖ =
√
m
4
+ ‖T (w)‖2m+12 , (6.18)
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‖Fx(x)‖ =
√
m
4
+ ‖T (x)‖2m+12 . (6.19)
After the asymmetric transformations on w and x, the correlation between Fw(w) and
Fx(x) is:
Corr (Fw(w), Fx(x)) =
wTx
(
U2
M2
)
√
m
4 + ‖T (w)‖2m+12
√
m
4 + ‖T (x)‖2m+12
. (6.20)
The norms ‖T (w)‖2 and ‖T (x)‖2 are less than 1. Therefore, both ‖T (w)‖2m+12 and
‖T (x)‖2m+12 converge to zero very fast when m is chosen to be large enough and the
correlation approximately becomes proportional to the inner product wTx. The sign
random projection can then be applied on Fw(w) and Fx(x) to generate respective
hashes. The Hamming distance between the asymmetric hashes of w and x is calculated
as:
N∑
t=1
(ht(Fw(w))⊕ ht(Fx(x))) . (6.21)
This Hamming distance is monotonically related to the correlation between transformed
vectors due to Equation 6.13 when number of bits N is sufficiently large, which in turn is
proportional to the inner product of wTx as given in Equation 6.20 when m is sufficiently
large. This means that we can use Hamming distance between these asymmetric hashes
instead of using inner products for making verification decisions.
6.4.3 Experiments and Results
We perform the same one-to-one fingerprint verification experiments on the FVC2002DB1A
database as in Section 6.3.1. Using the GMM supervectors as query fingerprint vectors
and SVM model templates as reference data, we conduct asymmetric hashing exper-
iments by following the verification protocol described in Section 6.3.1 where report
EERs for matching of GMM-SVM vectors are reported with 1024, 2048, and 4096 num-
ber of Gaussians as 2.231%, 1.911%, and 1.633%, respectively. Table 6.3 presents the
verification EERs for asymmetric hashing.
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# Gaussians GMM-SVM ALSH
1024 2.191% 2.362%
2048 1.911% 1.850%
4096 1.633% 1.661%
Table 6.3: Equal error rates for Asymmetric Locality Sensitive Hashing for correlation
The results show that the verification performance is not altered by the asymmetric
transformation followed by hashing. The error rates are very close to each other for
matching of the GMM-SVM vectors and ALSH hash vectors.
6.5 Improvements
In this section, we present two modifications that improve efficiency and accuracy of
the proposed fingerprint matching approach. First, we reduce the dimension of the
GMM-SVM feature vectors via Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [46]. Next, we use
random minutiae resampling for addressing data-imbalance problem in SVM to improve
our GMM-SVM minutiae representation.
6.5.1 Dimension Reduction with PCA before SVM Training
The GMM-SVM features are DN dimensional, where D = 50 is the number of DCT
coefficients and N = 1024, 2048, or 4096 is the number of Gaussians in the mixture.
Respectively, this corresponds to feature lengths of 51200, 102400, and 204800 which
are quite high for computational complexity of the SVM training process and matching
step. Thus, we apply PCA on the input features and reduce the dimension of D × N
to 799. The selection of 799 is due to the nature of the available data. FVC2002DB1
database includes 800 fingerprint samples (8 impression of 100 different fingers) and the
highest number of corresponding principal components is 800-1=799.
6.5.2 Random Minutiae Sampling for SVM Training
There is an evident imbalance between number of positive and negative samples for
SVM training at the reference template generation step. For every enrollment sample,
there is only 1 positive sample which corresponds to the given enrollment fingerprint
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GMM supervector. On the other hand, we have 99 negative samples that come from 99
different fingerprints available in the database. So, the training data for SVM has 100
samples and only 1 of them has a positive label (i.e. +1) and the remaining 99 samples
are labeled as negative (i.e. −1). Due to this data imbalance, the orientation of the
decision boundary is largely dictated by the negative samples in the training data.
In order to address the problem of data imbalance, we follow the work in [73] which
proposes to increase the number of positive samples by randomly selecting a subset
of the input features. Specifically, the order of minutiae in an enrollment fingerprint
is first randomized; then random subsets of minutiae are selected among this random
set. Each of these subsets is then used to produce a GMM supervector. A desirable
number of fingerprint supervectors can be produced by repeating this randomization
and partitioning process a number of times.
Given an enrollment fingerprint, we randomize the order of minutiae and selected the
first n% minutiae to create a subset. This procedure is repeated for different selections of
percentage n, and several subsets of minutiae are generated. Then, GMM supervectors
corresponding to each subset is created and included in the SVM training as positive
training samples, in addition to the GMM supervector of the original enrollment finger-
print full length minutiae set.
Table 6.4 shows the number of random sampling repetitions for different values of n.
A total of 16 subsets are generated and when combined with the original full length
minutiae set, 17 positive samples become available for SVM training from GMM super-
vectors.
n% # repetitions
95% 1
90% 2
85% 3
80% 4
75% 3
70% 2
65% 1
TOTAL 16
Table 6.4: Number of subsets selected for different percentages of minutiae
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The implemented improvements significantly decreases error rates of the GMM-SVM
approach (Table 6.5). Equal error rates usually decrease when the number of hash
dimension is higher. However, increasing the hash dimension even more does not lead
to lower error rates and usually hash dimensions between 218−222 are enough to obtain
the best accuracies (Figure 6.8). For brevity, the table do not include EERs for every
hash dimension. Instead, we report the results for hash dimension of 226. In addition,
FAR1000 values (i.e., FRR values where FAR = 10−3) are given in Table 6.6.
# Gaussians
GMM-SVM GMM-SVM Asymmetric
ALSH - 226
initial improved Transformation
1024 2.191% 1.180% 1.118% 1.123%
2048 1.911% 1.175% 1.024% 1.010%
4096 1.633% 1.218% 1.175% 1.180%
Table 6.5: Equal error rates of the improved system for FVC2002DB1A
# Gaussians
ALSH - 226
EER FAR1000
1024 1.123% 2.625%
2048 1.010% 2.500%
4096 1.180% 2.696%
Table 6.6: FAR1000 values of the improved ALSH scheme for FVC2002DB1A
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Figure 6.8: EERs for different hash dimensions - FVC2002DB1A
Figures 6.9(a) to 6.9(f) illustrate the corresponding ROC and DET curves for systems
with different number of Gaussians. For every implementation of the system, i.e., with
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(c) ROC curves for #Gaussians = 2048
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(d) DET curves for #Gaussians = 2048
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(e) ROC curves for #Gaussians = 4096
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(f) DET curves for #Gaussians = 4096
Figure 6.9: Error rates for FVC2002DB1A
different number of Gaussians in the mixture, reducing the feature dimension and in-
creasing the number of positive samples for SVM training improves the robustness of
the system and decreases matching errors.
Figure 6.10 illustrates the hash generation time for the ALSH scheme, i.e., the time
for generation of a bit-string from a query or reference GMM-SVM feature vector. The
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GMM-SVM feature generation and ALSH scheme are implemented in MATLAB and the
experimens are run on a 2.5 GHz with 64 GB of RAM PC using 64-bit Windows Server
2008 operating system. It should be noted that the final output of the system is a bit-
string, therefore the matching step is low cost and suitable for light weight applications
such as match-on-card systems. Figure 6.11 illustrates the matching time between two
hashes for different hash lengths. Even if the hash length is 226, the matching time is
less than 0.2 seconds, which is acceptable for a fingerprint verification system.
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Figure 6.10: ALSH hash generation time from GMM-SVM feature
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Figure 6.11: ALSH hash matching time
The verification performance of our approach is also validated on another fingerprint
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database, namely FVC2002DB2A. Table 6.7 includes the EERs corresponding to differ-
ent number of Gaussians and presents error rates for different steps of the framework
at each column. In addition, FAR1000 values (i.e., FRR values where FAR = 10−3) are
given in Table 6.8. Figure 6.12 presents the EERs for different hash dimensions and the
corresponding ROC and DET curves are given in Figures 6.13(a) to 6.13(f).
# Gaussians GMM-SVM
Asymmetric
ALSH - 222
Transformation
1024 1.834% 1.645% 1.664%
2048 1.426% 1.374% 1.393%
4096 1.123% 1.118% 1.000%
Table 6.7: Equal error rates of the improved system for FVC2002DB2A
# Gaussians
ALSH - 222
EER FAR1000
1024 1.664% 4.286%
2048 1.393% 3.018%
4096 1.000% 2.750%
Table 6.8: FAR1000 values of the improved ALSH scheme for FVC2002DB2A
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Figure 6.12: EERs for different hash dimensions - FVC2002DB2A
Two other fixed length approaches that can be compared with our system are the spec-
tral minutiae representation [17] and binary feature vector representation in [38]. How-
ever, they do not report error rates for the FVC2002DB1A database. When we analyze
their reported results on the FVC2002DB2A database (2.48% [17] and 3.88% [38] EERs
compared to minutiae matching 1.0% on FVC2002DB2A), we also observe similar per-
formance drops compared to minutiae matching. The best performance obtained for
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(a) ROC curves for #Gaussians = 1024
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(b) DET curves for #Gaussians = 1024
FAR (%)
10-2 10-1 100 101 102
G
AR
 (%
)
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
FVC2002DB2A - 2048 Gaussians
226
224
222
220
218
216
214
212
210
(c) ROC curves for #Gaussians = 2048
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(d) DET curves for #Gaussians = 2048
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(e) ROC curves for #Gaussians = 4096
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(f) DET curves for #Gaussians = 4096
Figure 6.13: Error rates for FVC2002DB2A
FVC2002DB2A with our approach is 1.000%, which is far lower than those two results.
It is also at the same level with minutiae matching result on the same database.
GMM-SVM Fingerprint Verification 93
Local Minutia 
Representation 
•Minutia DCT 
Patches 
Feature 
Modeling 
•GMM-UBM 
Approach 
Model 
Generation for 
Enrollment 
•SVM Model Training 
Hash 
Extraction 
•Asymmetric Locality 
Sensitive Hashing 
•Minutia Vicinities 
•Minutia PCA 
Patches 
•Generative Models 
•Discriminative 
Models 
•Linear Classifiers 
•Neural Networks 
•Thresholding for 
binarization 
Figure 6.14: Overall framework and other possibilities
6.6 Flexibility of the Framework - Enabling Other Possi-
bilities
The overall framework consists of four separate components and each component has
its own objective. This allows various other possible methods to either be integrated to
the system or replace the implemented ones (Figure 6.14).
The first component aims at representing local minutiae information in a compact way.
For this task, we propose using DCT coefficients of the minutia patch images. It is also
possible to use other image descriptors such as PCA or LBP (Local Binary Patterns).
Also, one does not have to use a minutia patch image at all. Instead, local minutiae con-
structs such as minutia vicinities, minutiae triplets or MCC (Minutiae Cylinder Codes)
features can be used at this stage.
Feature modeling is the second component and it aims at estimating the distribution of
the input local minutia vectors. In our framework, this has been accomplished by GMM-
UBM approach and each fingerprint is represented according to its relative alignment
into the background Gaussian mixture. In order to model the input feature distribu-
tion, other alternatives among parametric/non-parametric generative or discriminative
models can also be employed.
The next component generates a model template for a given enrollment fingerprint
sample. At this stage, we train a linear SVM for each enrollment sample. The main
aim at this step is to create a model for an enrollment sample that would discriminate
samples of the same fingerprint from other imposter fingerprint samples. A collection of
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linear classifiers are available at this stage and can be used in the same context as well.
In addition, Neural Networks can be another direction to discriminate positive samples
from negative ones.
The last step includes the binarization of the resulting fixed-length feature vectors. Bi-
nary representation of the features not only leads to faster matching, but also allows
combination of the fingerprint templates with cryptographic primitives based on homo-
morphic encryption and opens an alternative path to biometric template protection. We
propose to use asymmetric locality sensitive hashing at this stage and extract binary
strings, or namely hashes, that can easily be compared via Hamming distance. Other
possible thresholding strategies can also be followed here.
6.7 Discussion
In this chapter, we present a novel framework for fixed-length feature generation from
fingerprint minutiae. As each fingerprint has varying number of minutiae, it is a crit-
ical bottleneck for fingerprint template protection to obtain a fixed-length representa-
tion. Most of the current fingerprint verification systems use only minutiae information
since minutiae representation is globally regarded as the standard feature for fingerprint
matching. Therefore, other additional features that can be extracted from fingerprints,
such as ridge information, orientation, texture, etc., are not included in this study. Sin-
gular points (core and delta) are also included in the standard minutiae formats (i.e.
ISO 19794-2 [60]), however their automatic detection can be misleading. Also, not all
fingerprint images include singular points due to exaggerated displacement. So, we keep
singular points out of discussion in this work.
In order to address the security and privacy concerns regarding protection of the minutiae
templates, we propose a multi step feature generation framework based on GMM-SVM
approach. The last step of the framework includes the binarization of the obtained
fingerprint features without decreasing the representative ability while keeping the rep-
resentation as compact as possible. Asymmetric locality sensitive hashing provides two
separate transformations. One of them is applied on query fingerprint templates or the
GMM-SVM Fingerprint Verification 95
other one on reference data that is previously stored in the system. These transfor-
mations allow the use of locality sensitive hashing for converting the GMM-SVM fea-
ture vector into binary hash vectors. The experiments conducted on publicly available
fingerprint databases show the success of our system and its superiority over existing
fixed-length minutiae representations.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Biometric template protection methods are natural extensions of existing biometric
recognition systems. These methods aim at securing the templates of system users that
are either saved in smart cards or large biometric databases depending on the system
design. The security and privacy of biometric templates are of greatest importance and
attacks to biometric systems and databases severely threaten the security and privacy
of the society.
This dissertation evaluates one of the current biometric template protections methods,
namely biometric hashing, from security and privacy aspects. Thorough analysis of
biometric hashing requires theoretical evaluation of the method as well as analysis of
practical attacks. In this study, we theoretically analyze the unpredictability of biohashes
via estimated entropy and the amount of information carried in a biohash is measured
for the first time. In addition, several inversion attacks are proposed and weaknesses
of biometric hashing is discussed. Thus, a complete assessment of biometric template
protection with biometric hashing is presented.
Fingerprint modality stands out from other biometric modalities due its distinct prop-
erties. The standard matching of fingerprints depends on minutiae features which have
a non-constant length by nature. This does not allow current biometric template pro-
tection methods to be applied for securing minutiae templates. Spectral minutiae rep-
resentation is one of the previous methods proposed to provide a fixed-length feature
vector for fingerprint minutiae. This work includes an evaluation of this method and a
potential template protection for spectral minutiae via biometric hashing.
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This dissertation presents a novel framework to bypass the bottleneck of varying length
input feature to template protection by generating a fixed-length representation of fin-
gerprint minutiae. This task requires two subtasks to be completed. First of all, discrim-
inative features that represent the local minutia structures has to be extracted. Second,
the distribution of such local features should be modeled. Local minutia information is
captured by a minutia patch image and expressed via the first D DCT coefficients of
this image. The GMM-SVM approach, which was first applied to speaker verification, is
adapted to fingerprint verification based on minutiae features with some modifications.
Given a fingerprint sample, its minutiae information is converted into a fixed-length fea-
ture vector and become securable with a biometric template protection method such as
fuzzy commitment and biometric hashing. Furthermore, the binarization of feature vec-
tors via asymmetric locality sensitive hashing enables the combination of homomorphic
encryption based cryptographic alternatives and minutiae information.
7.1 Evaluation of Biometric Hashing
Biometric hashing provides an intelligent solution for protecting biometric templates
and thus deserves considerable attention. However, vanilla biohashing has significant
security and privacy drawbacks, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Especially, if the
secret key of a user is known to an adversary, there is a significant drop in the entropy of
biohashes. So, novel random projection and quantization schemes are required to prevent
or limit this drop. However, entropy is not the only theoretical metric in analyzing
biometric template protection methods. Other privacy and security metrics should also
be investigated and ways to implement them on biometric hashing should be studied.
The reconstruction of the biometric template or the original signal from biohash is an-
other security and privacy aspect of biometric hashing as discussed in Chapter 4. There-
fore, better biohashing schemes that address the improvements in theoretical security
should also be studied in order to provide resistance against inversion attacks.
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7.2 Template Protection for Fingerprint Minutiae
One of the main supporting ideas of this dissertation is that a fixed-length representation
for minutiae is required for fingerprint template protection. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss
this requirement in depth and propose novel solutions. The GMM-SVM framework is
able to fill this gap by offering a fixed-length representation which can be combined
with existing template protection methods such as fuzzy commitment and biohashing.
A possible future work would be investigating applicable template protection methods
and securing fingerprint minutiae templates using GMM-SVM features.
Asymmetric locality sensitive hashing provides a successful binary representation for
GMM-SVM features. This allows the use of cryptographic primitives and homomorphic
encryption for securing minutiae information. A promising area of future work would
be building novel encryption strategies for securing binary minutiae features of this
framework.
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